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Who are we and what do we do?
The International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and CARE Norway, in collaboration with national partners in Africa, are implementing a project to increase the effectiveness of seed-based interventions in acute and chronically 
stressed African farming systems.
 Consensus is emerging from applied research and rigorous ex post facto 
evaluations that conventional seed relief poses concerns. These include:
■ Missing, inadequate or incorrect diagnosis of seed insecurity, with the 
problem often (mistakenly) assumed to be one of seed unavailability. 
■ Predominance of supply-side approaches, with a strong reliance on the 
commercial seed sector for relief seed.
■ Lack of understanding of farmer seed systems and the important roles they 
have to play in agricultural relief and recovery.
■ Lack of appreciation of the central importance of local markets in informal 
and more integrated seed systems.
■ Repetitive relief interventions leading to chronic seed aid.
 CIAT serves as the project coordinator with funding from USAID/Ofﬁce of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). CIAT’s interest in seed systems under 
stress dates to the Rwanda Seeds of Hope project of 1995-6, where the impact 
of disaster on seed systems and agrobiodiversity were both key issues. CRS, 
also with funding from OFDA, is actively engaged in agriculture recovery 
wherever there is a need in Africa, and emphasizes approaches that stimulate 
enhanced production and income generation. CARE Norway, with funding from 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has developed expertise across 
broad areas of agriculture recovery. 
 
 The goal of the Seed Systems Under Stress project is:
To assist disaster-affected and chronically stressed communities in 
recovery by strengthening seed systems used by farmers and restoring 
productivity and enhancing system resilience.
 
 The project seeks to inﬂuence and enhance the knowledge, attitudes and 
practices of donors and practitioners as they support and undertake seed 
assistance. It does so by increasing understanding, ﬁrstly of the impacts 
of disaster and sustained stress on seed systems; and secondly of the 
effectiveness of varied seed-aid responses on efforts to strengthen seed 
systems in the short and longer term.
 New knowledge, as well as synthesis of better practice is being generated 
by this project, and Briefs 3 to 7 share insights on different topics related to 
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seed relief. However, we recognize that providing 
information is not on its own sufﬁcient because 
information alone does not necessarily convert to 
greater use of knowledge or altered practice. 
Therefore, the project is also providing new input on 
how to:
■ Analyze and assess seed systems and seed 
security.
■ Design seed-assistance interventions.
■ Monitor and evaluate seed-assistance 
interventions.
Briefs 8 to 10 include tools and guidance for 
practitioners and donors.
 The Project also aims to inﬂuence practices by 
other means. There are ongoing efforts to educate, 
learn with, and communicate with the range of 
agriculture recovery actors – from policy to ﬁeld 
implementation. Hence we welcome comments on 
these briefs as people read and use them, as well 
as more general information exchange and dialogue 
(see contacts below).
 For more information about the project, see 
http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/africa/seeds.htm
The Practice Briefs
No. 2 presents an overview of the Country Case 
Studies undertaken to guide the design of the tools 
presented in Briefs 8 to 10 as well as to examine the 
effects of different types of interventions. The case 
studies were undertaken in Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
 No. 3 introduces the general concept of seed 
security and differentiates parameters of availability, 
access, and seed and variety quality, as well as 
distinguishing chronic from acute stress. 
 Briefs 4 and 5 consider focused topics that cut 
across seed assistance and seed security. No. 4 
addresses issues of relief and agobiodiversity: the 
importance of diversity in stabilizing systems and 
the possible effects of various relief approaches 
in maintaining, enhancing, or undermining such 
diversity. No. 5 focuses on the opportunities and 
risks of using seed aid to move beyond the status 
quo ante by introducing seed of new varieties (or 
indeed, new crops altogether). 
 Briefs 6 and 7 present short overviews of 
practice. No. 6 looks at the range of seed systems 
routinely used by small farmers in Africa and 
highlights the escalating importance of local 
markets. Effective interventions depend on a solid 
understanding of such standard seed procurement 
practices. No. 7 sketches the current major seed-
system based response options, and reﬂects on their 
appropriateness in relation to the stresses on hand.
 The last set of briefs focus on tools and guidance. 
No. 8 examines how effective interventions depend 
on sound and timely assessment, which requires 
both a tool to assess seed system security and 
the knowledge and skill to use it. No. 9 starts to 
bring the cycle to a close by giving guidance on 
evaluating seed-aid projects, suggesting the types of 
evaluation needed and their content. The ﬁnal brief 
then looks to the future and suggests a checklist for 
the development of proposals for seed assistance. 
It is this last which builds on the range of lessons 
learned.
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:
Overview of Seed Systems Under 
Stress Project: Case Studies
Seed relief studies, managed by CIAT, CRS, and CARE Norway, have been published in a volume entitled Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development (see below for availability). The eight case studies were undertaken to evaluate 
various forms of emergency seed aid and to document how seed stress is 
diagnosed and how interventions are designed in concrete contexts. The 
objectives were to understand whether and how vulnerable farmers are being 
helped by the kinds of assistance they receive – and how to move forward to 
improve practice.
 The work unfolded over a two-year period in seven countries in Africa. 
In each case study the seed-aid practitioners were directly engaged in the 
evaluations and reﬂections, so that lessons learned could immediately 
inﬂuence the next steps of practice. It is to the credit of participating national 
agricultural research systems (NARS) and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) that they were willing to take a hard look at the effectiveness of their 
interventions. Equally, the donors, USAID/OFDA and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Norway, are to be lauded for promoting substantive follow-up on 
emergency assistance, because such follow-up is rare.
 Table 1 gives a broad overview of the major features of the case studies: 
the countries in which they were undertaken, the stresses that originally 
triggered a decision to supply seed-related assistance, and the types of 
interventions that were implemented. 
TABLE 1 
CIAT/CRS/CARE Norway Project: Major Descriptors
Case study descriptors Content
Countries Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe
Trigger Stresses Drought, civil strife, ﬂood, plant disease (and crop breakdown), distorted political economy
Interventions
· Direct seed distribution
· Seed vouchers and fairs
· Starter packs and targeted input distribution
· Community-based seed production
· Introduction of new varieties
Crop foci
Maize, beans, cassava, sorghum, rice, millet, cowpeas, 
bananas, sweet potatoes
also: wheat, barley, vanilla, cocoa, moringa
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Each case was chosen to be somewhat unique, in 
order to build up our body of knowledge concerning 
seed system relief. However, they all provide details 
on how the seed problem was initially assessed, the 
type of interventions that unfolded, and an ex-post 
facto evaluation of their effectiveness. Five of the 
cases address key features of speciﬁc interventions 
(such as introductions of new varieties), while three 
present overviews of the practice and evolution of 
seed aid on a country-wide basis.
Major features – case by case
■ The eastern Kenya case compares the 
effectiveness of Direct Seed Distribution (DSD) 
and Seed Vouchers and Fairs (SV&F), funded 
during the same period of the 1990s. Aspects 
such as number of beneﬁciaries reached, 
diversity on offer, ﬁnancial costs, and spin-
off effects (for example possible community 
empowerment) are considered. 
■  The northern Burundi case looks closely at how 
small traders (generally a specialist group) have 
been among the primary beneﬁciaries of seed 
vouchers and seed fairs. It gives insight into the 
type of trader involved (gender, scale, barriers 
to entry), the investment of trading proceeds 
into the local system, and opportunities for 
introducing innovations (including new varieties) 
via established traders.
■  The western Uganda case explores the ability of 
seed vouchers and fairs to supply farmers with 
seeds of preferred crops and varieties, and the 
effects of offering a wide range, even in a relief 
intervention. It also examines the degree to which 
the SV&F approach makes use of and bolsters the 
agrobiodiversity available in the wider farming 
systems, by comparing which crops and varieties 
are offered at the fair – and which are not.
■  The western Kenya case looks at the effectiveness 
of different seed channels (informal seed 
producer groups, local seed/grain markets) for 
moving new bean varieties during a period of 
dramatic production decline. Speed and extent 
of diffusion, as well as the quality of seed put on 
offer, ﬁgure as key assessment variables. 
■  From northern Mozambique, the study presents 
the challenges of responding to crop breakdown 
of the vegetatively-propagated staple, cassava, 
which was devastated by virus. Challenges of 
moving plant cuttings quickly and of diversifying 
in areas of single crop monopoly are analyzed.
■  The Malawi, Zimbabwe and Ethiopian cases 
analyze the longer-term patterns and effects 
of repeated seed aid. Lack of seed security 
assessments to address targeted problems, the 
emergence of a separate ‘Relief Seed System’ 
and the use of standard default responses 
(Direct Seed Distribution evolving to Community-
based Seed Production) are among the trends 
examined.
Overview lessons: select ﬁndings
The project also synthesized ﬁndings from across 
the different cases. We present several of the most 
important results below, but refer the reader to the 
full volume for more elaborate insight (Sperling et al. 
2004, see below for availability).
Relief organizations are generally using an 
‘acute’ response – seed aid – to treat what are 
more often ‘chronic’ poverty-based problems.
Emergency seed system assistance was delivered 
in six out of the eight cases examined in response 
to what was characterized as an acute stress (that 
is, an event of short-duration). However, more in-
depth analysis, in each of the six cases, showed the 
problems to be more chronic and systemic in nature, 
for example declining productivity, water-related 
stress, ongoing civil unrest, and misplaced political 
policies.
 The other two cases, both of crop breakdowns 
(one in western Kenya with beans and the other in 
northern Mozambique with cassava), were the only 
ones in which prior assessments actually took place.  
 These revealed that the ‘acute manifestation’ was 
also due to more systemic pressures, including the 
build-up of plant disease, lack of crop rotations and 
declining farm sizes.
 
TABLE 2
Chronic Seed Aid Distribution
Country Seed Aid Distributions
Burundi 22 seasons since 1995
Eastern Kenya 1992/93, 1995/97, 2000/02, 2004
Ethiopia Food aid 22 years since 1983/84. Seed aid on and off much of the time
Malawi 12 seasons or more
Zimbabwe 13 years (food aid, seed aid, or both)
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The result of an ‘acute’ response in a more 
chronically stressed context is that the problem is 
not alleviated and that seed system assistance is 
then needed repeatedly.
Chronic seed distribution is resulting in the 
emergence of a Relief Seed System.
Seed aid distribution is taking place in an alarmingly 
large number of countries: one season, two seasons, 
three seasons, and beyond. Giving seed aid is itself 
becoming a chronic activity. Table 2 summarizes the 
number of years seed aid has been given in several 
countries. There seem to be few checks for stopping 
such assistance (simply when funds dry up?) and 
deliberate exit strategies have not been planned.
 The rise of a chronic seed aid system has been 
identiﬁed as a proﬁtable business opportunity for 
entrepreneurs, who specialize in quick delivery of
a small range of crops. It has also led to the rise 
of a separate Relief Seed System (see cases from 
Ethiopia and Zimbabwe). 
No diagnosis and a mis-assumption of seed 
availability problems has been triggering 
seed-related disaster responses.
The lack of any diagnosis related to the seed system 
is a widespread problem (see Brief No. 7). In the 
absence of seed-related needs assessment, the 
default option has been to assume that there is a 
lack of available seed. Two sources of information 
indicate that this automatic assessment of lack of 
availability is often incorrect in the extreme.
■ A growing number of studies have traced 
where farmers in disaster situations sourced 
the seed they planted – in areas where seed 
aid distribution had taken place. Table 3 
indicates that in contexts where precise data 
were examined (and with larger sample sizes), 
relatively little of the seed sown came from 
emergency aid. Seed had been available in local 
channels, and particularly from local markets.
■ Seed availability has also been assessed via 
those who may supply seed in crisis periods: the 
local seed and grain traders. In Burundi, where 
seed aid has been given since 1995, 41 traders 
recounted their experience with seed sourcing 
over the past 10 years of drought and war. Thirty-
seven indicated that there had never been a 
problem with availability. The other four nuanced 
their answers, with only one trader suggesting an 
absolute lack at one point in time (see case study 
from Burundi).
TABLE 3 
Importance of Relief Seed in Farmers’ Overall Supply 
during Disaster Periods
Context Crop
% of seed 
sourced 
via relief*
Zimbabwe: drought and 
political instability 2003 Pearl millet 12
Rwanda: war 1995 Beans 28**
Kenya: drought 1997 Maize 11
Somalia: drought 2000 Sorghum 10-17
Somalia: drought 2003 Maize 3
* See Sperling et al., 2004 for full data sources
** The ﬁgure of 28% came from the ﬁrst seed distribution, two 
months after intensive ﬁghting ceased. Relief seed was then 
distribution again for the next major planting in January 1996, 
and only 6% of the bean seed came via relief channels.
 Only two types of case have been identiﬁed when 
availability of seed in a disaster context may be a 
fundamental constraint. First, where local seed on 
offer is no longer 
adapted to local 
growing contexts 
(for example in 
eastern Kenya, 
due to bean 
root rots, and 
in northern 
Mozambique, 
due to cassava 
brown streak). 
And secondly 
when there have 
been substantial 
shortfalls in 
production and 
local markets 
have never 
sufﬁciently developed to deliver seed or planting 
supplies. (Local markets prove particularly important 
as sources of seed in crisis, see Brief No. 6).
Seed availability is  
not necessarily the  
problem during  
emergencies.  
Practitioners need  
to understand the real  
constraints and  
opportunities – before  
they respond.
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In terms of implementation, there seems 
to be a broad default pattern, from direct 
seed distribution (DSD) to community-based 
multiplication schemes (CBMS).
At present, a relatively narrow range of responses 
are employed to bolster seed systems in stress. 
Diagnoses being minimal, the evolution of a seed-
related assistance pattern is well established (see 
case studies from Malawi, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia). 
During emergencies, institutions jump to direct seed 
distribution (DSD). During recovery, they move to 
community-based multiplication schemes (CBMS) 
schemes. So seed system assistance tends to be 
characterized by people doing what they already 
know, rather than what might be best under the 
particular circumstances.
Misplaced seed-quality parameters in 
emergency response result in overemphasis 
on seed health to the detriment of genetic 
quality.
Issues of seed quality shape the types of seed 
assistance that can unfold. Quality issues most 
often focus on whether the seed is certiﬁed or not 
(as many donors require formal veriﬁcation as a 
prerequisite for emergency seed procurement). 
Stereotypes typically equate certiﬁed and formal 
sector seed as being of high germination and good 
seed health, while farmer seed (home-produced 
and procured from the market) is typically judged 
to be of poor quality. Case studies show that such 
labels can be deceptive. The quality of formal-sector 
seed may not be as advertised (as in the case from 
western Kenya), while emergency-grade seed overall 
is of highly variable health and genetic quality (the 
case from eastern Kenya). Farmer seed and market 
seed has also proven to be of good quality, as 
assessed in laboratory analyses (western Kenya).
 The focus on seed health has diverted attention 
from what is probably the more important quality 
issue for seed: at the very least, the seed on offer 
must be adapted to the environmental conditions 
at hand. Genetic quality, in practice, has been given 
second priority in emergency responses. Varieties 
emerging from formal research sectors or on offer 
from commercial companies are assumed ‘good 
enough’, whether or not they have been selected for 
use in the regions of stress or for growing under the 
recipients’ management conditions. 
For full documentation see:
Sperling, L., Remington, T., Haugen, J.M., and Nagoda, S., 
eds. 2004, Addressing seed security in disaster response: 
linking relief with development. Cali, Colombia: International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture. Available for download from 
http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/africa/pdf/emergency_seed_aid_
case_studies.pdf
Understanding Seed Security
Inherent in the decision that seed aid is needed is an assumption that farmers themselves are not able to secure seed for their normal planting periods. Farmers’ ability to secure seed is described by the concept of seed security.
 The concept of seed security (and its inverse, insecurity) is often nuanced 
by two broad sets of parameters: duration (are the problems short or longer-
term?) and the different features needed to ensure security (if there are 
concerns, what types of diverse problems might farmers encounter?). We 
discuss both in this introduction to the concept of seed security. 
Distinguishing between Acute and Chronic Seed Security
To understand seed security it is important ﬁrst to distinguish between acute 
(short-term, transitory) and chronic (longer-term, long-lasting) seed security 
issues.
Acute Seed Insecurity
Acute seed insecurity is brought on by distinct, short-duration events that 
often affect a broad range of the population. It may be spurred by the 
failure to plant in a single season, the loss of a harvest, or by high levels of 
infestation of stored seed stocks. While during normal times households 
may variously be identiﬁed as seed secure, semi-secure, or always seed-
short, all may be affected during an acute event such as a ﬂood or short civil 
disturbance. Those farmers who recover quickly, with or without one-off seed-
related assistance, are often those who have suffered only acute stress. Note 
that acute food stress (and the need for food aid) is not necessarily followed 
by seed stress (and the need for some form of seed aid). Seed systems can be 
very resilient, and, for some crops (e.g. sorghum), small amounts will satisfy 
farmers’ practical sowing needs.
Chronic Seed Insecurity
Chronic seed insecurity is independent of acute stress or disaster, although 
it may be exacerbated by it. Chronic seed insecurity may be found among 
populations who have been marginalized in different ways: economically (for 
example, poor, little land, little labor); ecologically (for example, repeated 
drought, degraded land); or politically (in insecure areas, or on land with 
uncertain tenure arrangements). Populations that suffer chronic seed 
insecurity may be characterized by:
■ Continual shortage of adequate seed to plant.
■ Difﬁculties in acquiring seed off farm due to lack of funds.
■ The routine use of low quality seed and unwanted varieties.
The result is households with a built-in vulnerability to seed system calamities. 
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comes in many 
guises. Chronic 
insecurity differs from 
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Reﬂections on the relationship between acute 
and chronic insecurity
 
Acute and chronic seed insecurity will very often 
exist together during an emergency. Indeed, in cases 
where emergencies are recurrent events, for example 
in drought-prone areas, acute situations are nearly 
always superimposed on chronic problems that are 
rooted in poverty. Figure 1 aims to show conceptually 
the relationship between acute and chronic seed 
insecurity. At any given normal time a portion of 
the agricultural population, usually the majority, are 
seed-secure, with the poorest being those who fall 
below the theoretical security line. In a disaster, all 
may be affected to some degree, as harvests may 
decline overall and some seed stocks may be  
lost.    
 However, those just above the margins of security 
may fall into chronic seed stress if alleviating actions 
are not sufﬁcient. Similarly, those already in chronic 
stress may not recover above the line into seed 
security if they are simply assisted with one-off 
injections of seed aid. 
 Analysis of seed insecurity in the ﬁeld reveals two 
trends in the relationship between acute and chronic 
contexts.
■ First, there is increasing evidence of a general 
transition from acute to chronic seed insecurity, 
rather than the presumed goal of recovery. This 
occurs because various forms of quick relief, such 
as the free distribution of improved varieties, can 
undermine the functioning of local seed systems, 
alter more robust crop proﬁles, and create 
marked dependencies. Thus, it is alarming – but 
not surprising – that in the year 2000 farmers in 
the Tana Region of Kenya routinely listed ‘seed 
relief’ as one of the basic channels by which they 
count on accessing seed season after season.
■ Secondly, closer analysis is showing that many of 
the aid cases originally considered acute exhibit 
aspects of more chronic stress. Six out of the 
eight seed intervention cases we examined in this 
project (see Brief No. 2) show acute aid being 
implemented in situations that are primarily 
chronically-stressed, with such seed aid being 
delivered not as a one-off intervention, but 
repeatedly. Acute emergency measures are being 
implemented in lieu of possibly more effective 
and more long-term support. This is not a new 
insight – but it is one that has yet to change 
practical responses to major seed emergencies.
FIGURE 1: The relationship between seed security and poverty, in times of acute and chronic stress.  
Line A represents a stylized relationship between poverty (x axis; expressed in terms of assets) and seed security (y axis). 
The point S represents an arbitrary seed security threshold: above the broken line is seed security, below it seed insecurity. 
In locales for most interventions, in normal times, a proportion of the population, represented by the thicker portion of line 
A, is chronically seed insecure. In an emergency, two things may happen: (1) livelihood assets may decrease, so the entire 
population will move down the line, such that more of the population will be seed insecure by virtue of their increased 
poverty; (2) there may be a shift downwards of the entire line to B, perhaps due to short-term problems of seed availability 
or access. Either way, a larger proportion of the poor, the vulnerable population, will become seed insecure, as represented 
by the additional, dashed part of line B.
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Distinguishing among the  
Dimensions of Seed Security:  
The Seed Security Framework 
The concept of seed security embodies several 
diverse aspects: differentiating among these is 
crucial to promote those features that foster seed 
security as well as to anticipate the varied ways in 
which such security might be threatened.
 The Seed Security Framework in Table 1 outlines 
the fundamental elements of seed security: seed has 
to be available, farmers need to be able to access to 
it, and the seed quality must be sufﬁcient to promote 
healthy seed system functioning.
TABLE 1
Seed Security Framework: Basic Elements
Parameter Seed Security
Availability
Sufﬁcient quantity of seed 
of adapted crops are within 
reasonable proximity (spatial 
availability), and in time for 
critical sowing periods (temporal 
availability).
Access
People have adequate income or 
other resources to purchase or 
barter for appropriate seeds. 
Quality
Seed is of acceptable quality and 
of desired varieties (seed health, 
physiological quality, and variety 
integrity).
Availability is deﬁned narrowly as whether sufﬁcient 
quantity of seed of target crops is present within 
reasonable proximity (spatial availability) and in time 
for critical sowing periods (temporal availability). It 
is essentially a geographically-based parameter, and 
so is independent of the socio-economic status of 
farmers.
 Seed access is a parameter speciﬁc to farmers or 
communities. It largely depends upon the assets of 
the farmer or household in question: whether they 
have the cash (ﬁnancial capital) or social networks 
(social capital) to purchase or barter seed. 
 Seed quality includes two broad aspects: seed 
quality per se, and variety quality. Seed quality 
consists of physical, physiological and sanitary 
attributes (such as the germination rate, and the 
absence or presence of disease, stones, sand, broken 
seed or weeds). Variety quality consists of genetic 
attributes, such as plant type, duration of growth 
cycle, seed color and shape, palatability and so on 
(see Brief No. 6). 
 In using the framework, it is important to 
emphasize that the distinction between availability 
and access is dependent on scale. At some level, 
if one is willing to pay enough to transport seed 
from far enough away, seed is always available. 
Likewise, the concepts of availability and quality 
are interrelated. If seed is available which will grow 
and mature to harvest, but which is of otherwise 
low quality or of unwanted crops or varieties, this 
constraint would usually be considered under the 
quality parameter, but one could question whether 
appropriate seed is available at all.
More Reﬁned Analyses of Seed Security 
Leading to More Targeted Appropriate 
Responses 
Formal deﬁnitions of seed security are fairly recent, 
as is the notion that seed security assessments need 
to be distinct from those that focus on food security. 
In standard ﬁeld practice, food security assessments 
inevitably assume that food insecurity means seed 
insecurity. The cause of this seed insecurity is also 
invariably diagnosed as a problem of availability; 
TABLE 2
Seed System Problems and Broadly Appropriate Responses
Parameter of the problem Acute (short-term) Chronic (longer-term)
Unavailability of seed Direct distribution of seed (possibly for sale)
Support development of seed production, 
including commercial enterprise, where 
viable
Poor and vulnerable farmers do 
not have access to seed
Cash disbursement
Seed Fairs with vouchers or cash
Local procurement and distribution 
Poverty-reduction programs: e.g. support 
development of
•  Income-generating activities
•  Agro-enterprises 
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that is, there are not enough seeds in a region. A 
better understanding of the seed security concept, 
along with informed used of a seed system security 
assessment tool (see Brief No. 7), should help lead 
to more targeted diagnoses of problems at hand as 
well as to more targeted responses.
 Using the two aspects of seed security outlined 
above, Table 2 gives examples of more targeted 
responses to seed insecurity, to address explicit 
constraints in seed availability, access and quality 
in the short-term (acute) and long term (chronic). 
(See also Brief No. 7 for a more extensive analysis.) 
So, for example, if ’seed availability’ is assessed 
as the problem, seed-based interventions, such as 
seed importation (for acute shocks) or development 
of community-based seed production enterprises 
(for chronic stress), may be appropriate. However, 
a diagnosis of ‘seed access’ might wisely trigger 
a more holistic analysis of livelihood strategies. 
In the acute phase, providing farmers with cash 
or vouchers to get their desired seed might be 
on the mark to address short-term problems of 
access. However, an identiﬁcation of chronic access 
problems should lead practitioners to look well 
beyond seed and seed security constraints. The 
inability to access a certain necessary good on a 
repeated basis is usually equated with problems of 
basic poverty. Initiatives to help farmers generate 
income and strengthen their livelihood base would 
be essential here. 
 Finally, we emphasize that lack of use of a Seed 
Security Framework (availability, access, utilization) 
and an acute vs chronic perspective has generally 
resulted in few explicit assessments of seed security 
to date. Getting a better handle on the concept of 
seed security is but a ﬁrst important step toward 
designing seed security related interventions that 
effectively address the real problems at hand. 
Agrobiodiversity and Seed Relief
Disaster, as well as subsequent relief and recovery activities, can have signiﬁcant impacts on agrobiodiversity. In this context, by agrobiodiversity we mean the full diversity of crops and their varieties that may exist in a farming system. We are not speciﬁcally 
addressing livestock, nor other unmanaged components of systems (such as 
bees or wild plants).
 In terms of disaster effects and humanitarian aid, the issue of 
agrobiodiversity is important for three groups of stakeholders:
■ For those focusing on quick recovery; greater agrobiodiversity contributes 
to production stability. It helps farmers to avoid and mitigate different 
risks, because different crops and varieties resist different diseases, insect 
attacks and environmental stresses such as drought better than others. 
A range of agrobiodiversity can also help farmers to stagger their harvest 
of incoming food supplies and labor needs, which is important when 
resources are few and far between. 
■ For those focusing on plant genetic resources, maintaining the diversity 
of crops and varieties is important in itself because this genetic diversity 
provides the raw material for agriculture’s future adaptations as well as the 
genetic traits for crop improvement programs.
■ For those focusing on longer-term system strengthening, the introduction 
of new varieties potentially increases productivity, and captures market 
opportunities – but also may affect agrobiodiversity negatively and 
positively.
This brief examines the more immediate and practical dimensions of 
agrobiodiversity in farming systems.
 During normal times, a range of agrobiodiversity allows farmers to spread 
risk, increases their resilience to shock, and often translates into more 
nutritious diets. These are key issues when people live from what they sow. 
During emergency stress times the stabilizing features of agrobiodiversity 
become potentially even more important. So what features of agrobiodiversity 
should be considered in responding to emergencies? And what impact do 
different kinds of activity have on agrobiodiversity? This brief explores those 
questions.
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Agrobiodiversity 
enables farmers 
to spread risk 
and increase 
resilience to shock. 
These stabilizing 
features of 
agrobiodiversity 
become more 
important during 
emergency 
stress periods.
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Why Agrobiodiversity is a Central  
Concern in Emergency Response
Issues of agrobiodiversity need to inform emergency 
response in several ways. First, relief efforts 
should not compromise functioning systems of 
agrobiodiversity; that is, they should not undermine 
the use of a wide range of adapted crops and 
varieties that remain productive and in wide use. 
Secondly, if supply-side interventions are deemed 
necessary, the interventions should embrace 
principles associated with the maintenance of 
agrobiodiversity. These principles include:
■ Attention to local adaptedness of crops and 
varieties.
■ Focus on crops and varieties that meet local 
preferences, putting multiple options on offer.
■ Treating farmers as customers and giving them 
choice.
 There is scant evidence to date that disasters 
(such as civil war, drought or ﬂood) signiﬁcantly 
alter proﬁles of agrobiodiversity. When loss does 
occur, it often proves to be only temporary. (The 
exceptions are cases where crops or varieties break 
down, usually as 
a result of disease 
or declining 
soil fertility.) By 
contrast, there 
are several 
examples where 
conﬂict-induced 
displacements 
have exposed 
farmers to new 
crops and new 
varieties that they 
then bring back 
with them when 
they return home, 
resulting in a gain 
– not a loss – of 
agrobiodiversity. 
 However, an 
increasing number 
of ﬁeld cases 
show that seed relief interventions, the humanitarian 
responses themselves, alter agrobiodiversity 
proﬁles and management negatively. The delivery 
of repeated seed aid changes farmers’ seed 
procurement strategies away from actively sourcing 
several, often traditional, varieties via the local 
seed systems towards passively receiving hand 
outs of a small number (often only one) of modern 
varieties. Direct Seed Distribution, when it is of 
a limited number of crops (and especially with a 
concentration on maize), can also skew patterns of 
plant use towards crops that may hold up less well 
under the stresses that farmers routinely encounter, 
particularly drought.
 The central need to look at agrobiodiversity within 
emergency responses has been formally recognized 
in recent guidelines issued by the United Nations 
agency responsible for agriculture, The Food and 
Agriculture Organization. FAO’s Guiding Principles 
for Seed Relief asserts, inter alia, that:
■ Depending on the context, the focus in an 
emergency should normally be on keeping the 
local seed system operational…
■ Seed relief interventions should facilitate farmers’ 
choices of crops and varieties … that are adapted 
to environmental conditions and farmers’ needs…
 (See Sperling et al, 2004, full details below.)
 In terms of agrobiodiversity, perhaps it is 
fortunate that seed aid has a circumscribed role in 
an emergency response. Seed aid is never provided 
to all farm community members – and often the 
better-off and less-affected farmers receive nothing.  
 Also, even when a family does receive seed aid, 
it rarely covers all of their seed requirements. So 
giving farmers less than their total seed needs in an 
emergency distribution can actually be beneﬁcial for 
keeping local varieties in production. 
 Local crops and seed often remain in circulation 
and can be accessed via markets or exchange 
channels to complement the free (and often ‘exotic’) 
emergency seed assistance.
 
Seed Relief Approaches that Bolster 
and Strengthen Agrobiodiversity
Not all relief approaches are equally effective in 
bolstering and stabilizing seed and farming systems. 
We comment below on those that practitioners 
assert may do ‘less harm’ and that, in select cases, 
may actually support and enhance the range of 
crops and varieties in use.
Food Aid – Including Seed Protection Rations 
(SPR)
Food aid is underrated as a seed relief strategy. 
Delivery of such aid can allow remaining seed stocks 
and variety diversity to be maintained (and not 
eaten). The rationale for the SPR is that food aid 
is given particularly for the months prior to sowing 
time, during the ‘lean times’. 
There is scant evidence 
to date that disasters 
themselves signiﬁcantly 
alter agrobiodiversity 
proﬁles. It is rather 
the subsequent 
humanitarian responses 
which often have 
negative consequences. 
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 A note of caution is important here in lauding 
the virtues of food aid as a seed rescuing (or 
maintaining) strategy. In farmers’ minds, food 
aid and seed aid may not be separate entities 
– and gifts of food may subsequently be planted. 
Hence, in several countries of southern Africa, 
genetically-modiﬁed food aid from the US has not 
been accepted in recent drought years because 
of fears that it would ﬁnd its way into the ﬁelds. 
Consideration also needs to be given to food aid 
from in-country purchases: large procurements may 
impact on the overall availability of grain and local 
prices of seed grain. 
Direct Seed Distribution that Procures from 
Local Seed Systems
Direct Seed Distribution takes many forms – some 
of which can damage local seed (and economic) 
systems. Bringing seed in from outside can 
undermine functioning markets and introduce 
cultivars that are not well adapted to local 
conditions. In terms of agrobiodiversity, however, 
one variant of DSD seems to minimize damage to 
crops and varieties. When seed procurement draws 
from local markets, or regional traders, and when 
it distributes varieties from similar agro-ecological 
zones, farmers may get access to varieties they know 
and have used and that are well adapted. In variants 
of this local procurement strategy, implementers 
have distributed variety mixes (where these are 
routinely sown), and have tried to distribute local 
varieties. An inherent weakness in seed procurement 
is that the implementing agency must act as a 
competent broker for farmer clients and must 
know and understand seed quality and the speciﬁc 
preferences of farmers. Further, it is well known 
that local middlemen sometimes buy seed from 
small farmers to sell to NGOs who then distribute 
the seed back to the same or similar small farmers. 
One has to wonder whether the small farmers 
or the middlemen beneﬁt most from this kind of 
intervention. 
Seed Vouchers, Usually Combined with Fairs 
(SV&F)
Seed vouchers permit farmers themselves to select 
among the crops and varieties available within a 
region. These may be local (sourced from local 
markets or traders) or improved (sourced from 
commercial companies or specialized outlets). 
The point is that farmers themselves can choose 
and manage the crops and varieties they desire. 
Advertised seed fairs, which bring farmer buyers and 
sellers together in dedicated events, provide a range 
of seed from which farmers can choose. While fairs 
cannot put on offer the full set of diversity available 
in a farming system, the proﬁle of crops (often 5-15) 
and varieties (20 upwards) available in one place 
is relatively broad. Of course, putting diversity on 
offer does not guarantee that farmers will access it. 
Recipients often focus on one or two crops,  
and choose the more popular varieties of these. 
Introduction of New Varieties in Forms of 
Seed Relief (Under Select Circumstances)
Under select circumstances, new varieties can 
help to broaden the diversity available in an area 
(although specialists in plant genetic resources 
routinely assert that new varieties push out the old). 
Key aspects to consider if introducing new varieties 
in seed relief include:
■ That farmers 
need to be given 
a choice on 
whether to use 
these varieties 
or not (i.e. that 
new varieties 
be one among 
several options 
on offer).
■ That seed 
be given in 
‘test’ sizes, to 
mitigate farmer 
risk.
■ That sufﬁcient 
information 
accompany the 
seed so that 
farmers can 
make informed use and management decisions 
for integrating (or not) these new elements into 
existing farming systems.
■ That there is research involvement to learn from 
farmer evaluations of the new materials.
■ In cases where the intervention is not needed 
immediately, that demonstration plots (or other 
ﬁeld stages) are used to help farmers assess the 
products they may decide to sow for themselves.
 (See also Brief No. 5.)
Viewing emergency relief through an agrobiodiversity 
lens includes several basic principles (see Box 1)
 In brief, the use of agrobiodiversity, that is the 
use of a range of crops and varieties, is a proven 
risk mitigation strategy that works in all sorts of 
situations, from drought to conﬂict. 
Food aid is an  
underrated strategy  
for seed-related  
assistance. It can  
allow people to save  
their remaining seed 
stocks and variety  
diversity, rather  
than be forced to  
sell or eat them. 
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High levels of agrobiodiversity can also aid farmers 
nutritionally and economically. Seed aid should 
never dramatically alter such diversity either by 
adding or removing substantial amounts of diversity. 
Agrobiodiversity proﬁles can be dynamic, but the 
process has to be planned, and with farmers having 
the knowledge, skills and tools to make informed 
decisions about the crops and varieties they sow.
Acknowledgments:
L. Sperling, T. Osborn and D. Cooper 2004 Towards 
effective and sustainable seed relief activities: Report of 
the Workshop on Effective and Sustainable Seed Relief 
Activities. Rome, 26-28 May 2003. FAO Plant Production 
and Protection Paper 181.
■ Do not engage in seed relief that undermines 
functioning systems or that may compromise already 
stressed ones.
■ Do not base the seed response on a large scale transfer 
of seed of varieties not currently used by farmers.
■ Think hard before importing seed into a region and 
never provide a single variety of just one crop for all 
farmers: vary crops and varieties. 
■ Build on what is working: strive to stabilize seed 
systems through use of the channels farmers routinely 
use. Keep normal ﬂows of crops and varieties moving.
■ If supply-side seed interventions are necessary, consider 
those that may maintain or add agrobiodiversity.
■ In all cases, give farmers crop and variety options, 
and the leverage (as well as the information) to 
strategize about what does or does not ﬁt into their 
agrobiodiversity planning.
■ If new variety introductions are on offer, monitor their 
performance, feed back to research and the formal seed 
sector, and actively consider effects on agrobiodiversity.
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Principles for sustaining and promoting agrobiodiversity in seed relief response
Using Seed Aid to Give Farmers 
Access to Seed of New Varieties
Farmers are keen to obtain and evaluate new crop varieties. This process of experimentation and subsequent introduction of adapted and accepted varieties can potentially strengthen farmers’ cropping systems by increasing yields, improving drought resilience, boosting 
resistance to pests and diseases and also by capturing new market 
opportunities. 
 Introducing new varieties can also play a role in restoring food security at 
times of crisis. Crises may alter preferences, for instance when populations 
relocate, or crisis may even be caused by crop and variety breakdowns (for 
example spurred by plant disease or sharply declining soil fertility). Both 
situations leave farmers in want of appropriate planting material. Crises may 
also be seen as an opportunity to introduce new varieties, via the extensive 
seed aid channels, in order to promote what are considered more ‘modern’ 
practices and thus to strengthen systems plagued by low production.
 Regardless of the potential for improving smallholder productivity through 
the introduction of new varieties, it is important to start by questioning the 
legitimacy of such introductions during crises. In periods of emergency 
and prolonged stress, small farmers are already at levels of increased risk. 
They are generally poorer, having lost household assets, livestock or crops 
in the ﬁeld, and they cannot afford to waste further often scarce land or 
labor resources. Further, they need to have some conﬁdence that the next 
planting season will yield better than the present, stressed, one. Outside aid, 
minimally, should put on offer products or processes at least as good as those 
already in farmers’ hands. While formal sector varieties are referred to as 
‘improved’ and the quality of the seed is certiﬁed, these varieties often yield 
poorly in many smallholder cropping systems. Such new varieties may not be 
adapted to the local agro-ecological conditions and farmers may not possess 
the management inputs (for example fertilizers and pesticides) crucial for 
their growth. So an ‘improved variety’ does not mean that performance is 
guaranteed.
 This brief suggests ‘better practice’ for introducing (or not) new varieties 
in situations of acute and chronic stress. It presents a series of technical 
guidelines that need to be considered prior to any variety introductions. 
The brief is also framed by a set of precautionary notes: if humanitarian 
assistance involves crop or variety introductions, even ‘emergency’ short-term 
interventions should be programmed within a longer-term plan of action.
Introducing Varieties in Acute Stress Periods
Seed aid that is considering the possible introduction of crops or varieties 
has to be programmed to embrace a well-planned set of steps. These are 
summarized in Box 1 and elaborated in the text that follows.
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New varieties can 
increase food 
security in the wake 
of disasters, but 
only if practitioners 
work with farm 
communities and 
other informed 
personnel to 
minimize risk. 
Introducing 
new crops and 
varieties, especially 
after crisis, also 
requires a 
multi-year vision 
and commitment.
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Conduct a Seed System Security Assessment
Often, a disaster and its ensuing seed aid are viewed 
as an opportunity for large scale distribution of seed 
of modern varieties. An assumption may be made 
that farmers have experienced crisis in part due to 
a weakness in their crop systems – which would 
include under-performing crops and varieties. 
 Before contemplating any introduction, 
implementers should conduct rigorous seed system 
security assessments (see Brief No. 7). This should 
be done with the recipient communities and with 
informed research and development personnel who 
know the local agro-
ecological systems 
well. It is important 
to get an overview 
of the strengths and 
weaknesses of current 
agricultural and seed 
systems. Teams also 
need to have an in-
depth understanding 
of the root causes 
for any stress to 
the seed system. 
Fundamentally, a decision to introduce new varieties 
needs to be founded on sufﬁcient evidence that new 
varieties offer promising opportunities, and, equally, 
that their introduction will not expose farmers 
further to increased risk.
 Initial prior assessments must also provide good 
insight into farmers’ awareness of, access to and 
use of new varieties. Answers to key questions (Box 
2) will help guide further strategy – and may be 
particularly important for ensuring that the right 
farmers (i.e. the vulnerable) are well-served by the 
intervention.
Work with Farm Communities and Other 
Informed Personnel to Choose Possible New 
Varieties
A Seed System Security Assessment for any given 
region should result in an inventory of varieties by 
crop, including varieties currently used by farmers, 
as well as new varieties not yet available to farmers 
for testing. New varieties of potential interest to 
farmers usually come from the formal sector; 
international research centers, national research 
organizations and commercial seed companies. 
Institutions proposing candidate varieties for 
use in speciﬁc farming regions should submit 
documentation detailing performance of the new 
materials to those considering the distribution of 
such entries (e.g. NGOs). Such documentation might 
also be usefully reviewed by knowledgeable local 
extension agents as well as key farmers (depending, 
of course, on its language and format).
 The suitability of new materials for use in a 
particular zone and for a well-deﬁned client group 
needs to be assessed. Not everything new is good. 
Appropriate varieties should have: 
■ Evidence of adaptability to cropping system and 
prevailing agro-ecological conditions.
■ Evidence of acceptability according to the 
preferences and experiences of farmers who 
are most affected by the stress. If, traditionally, 
farmers produce for domestic consumption, 
varieties should be acceptable for these 
standards.
■ Evidence that they can be used under the 
management regimes in routine practice, 
including by the vulnerable (i.e. not be highly 
dependent on inputs such as fertilizers that the 
poorest farmers often cannot access).
■ Conduct a Seed System Security Assessment.
• What are the current seed system weaknesses and 
strengths?
• Would new varieties open up promising opportunities: 
why, how, for whom?
• What are the potential risks?
■ Work with farm communities and other informed 
personnel to choose possible new varieties.
 Is there sufﬁcient prior evidence that varieties:
• Are adapted to the speciﬁc agro-ecological zones?
• Meet farmers’ acceptability criteria (harvest and  
post harvest for subsistence and market  
use)?
• Can be successfully used under farmers’  
own management conditions (e.g. without  
fertilizer)?
■ Design introductions so as to minimize risk and 
maximize farmers’ informed choice.
• Offer ‘test size’ packets: introductions should be 
small-scale.
• Give farmers choices: to use the variety or not. And if 
possible, put several varieties on offer.
• Provide sufﬁcient accompanying information to allow 
farmers to make variety choices and management 
decisions (planting time, levels of input use, crop 
associations).
■ Build in explicit monitoring and evaluation of new 
varieties: are they performing? For whom? Where?
■ Count on a multi-year process.
• Can the new introductions be successfully integrated 
into stressed farming systems? 
• If yes, is further ﬁne-tuning needed?
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Introducing New Varieties in Acute Stress Periods: Key Steps
Small test packets 
and plenty of 
information will 
enable farmers to 
decide whether and 
how to incorporate 
a new variety or crop 
into their system.
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 Note that maize hybrids, in particular, are often 
promoted as new items on offer in stress contexts. 
However, their performance under low-input, high 
stress farming has been uneven, and has often failed 
almost completely (see Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and 
Zimbabwe cases in Brief No. 2). Simply, hybrids 
usually demand inputs and better soils. Furthermore, 
the seed supply needs to be ‘bought’ the next 
season because hybrids cannot be resown and retain 
their productive vigor.
 It is important for implementers to be very clear 
about the objective of introducing new varieties. 
In an agricultural recovery project, introductions 
should give farmers access to seed of new and 
desired varieties, so that they can experiment with 
them and add them to their systems if they choose 
to. The objective should not be to satisfy 100% of 
a farmer’s seed needs with commercial seed (nor, 
as a hidden objective, to expand the customer 
base for the commercial sector). It should also not 
be to replace local varieties that may be seen by 
outsiders as inferior.
Design Introductions so as to Minimize Risk 
and Maximize Farmers’ Informed Choice
Even use of ‘best bet’ varieties (that is, those pre-
screened for potential adaptability, acceptability 
and usability) is not risk free. In an acute crisis, 
farmers need access to test packets of seeds, a 
basket of variety choices among which to select 
test candidates and enough information to make 
informed decisions about the varieties  
offered.
Packets 
Seed delivered in small quantities will enable 
farmers to learn about the new materials without 
compromising their production stability. Sizes 
should be small enough that any production loss 
will not dent harvests. Farmers in many African 
regions are used to the format of such ‘peanut-sized 
packages’ and have favorably received new varieties 
this way in the East, Central and Southern African 
regions.
Variety Basket – and Choices 
Farmers should always have a choice as to whether 
they want to accept a new variety or not. In addition, 
experiences drawn from actual ﬁeld practice 
suggest that a basket of varieties should be on offer 
to contribute to crop and variety diversity and to 
potentially increase resilience.
Sufﬁcient Information 
Farmers need solid accompanying information to 
make knowledgeable choices and management 
decisions. Written information sheets (preferably in 
local languages) have proved useful, as have pictures 
and diagrams for the less literate. Information 
leaﬂets should communicate to farmers the 
existence of new varieties that may be of interest, 
describe the attributes of the new materials and 
give guidance on how to manage them (including 
signaling management practices that may differ from 
farmers’ norms). 
Build in Explicit Monitoring and Evaluation  
of New Varieties
All too often seed aid is an extension of food aid: 
monitoring and evaluation focus on logistics and 
subsequent reports 
are administrative 
and perfunctory. 
Increasingly, however, 
seed aid is seen as 
very different from 
food aid. Better, more 
nuanced assessments 
of seed systems 
and seed security 
are resulting in 
recommendations of 
more complex and 
integrated responses. 
Especially when an 
objective of variety introduction is included, it is 
important to monitor and evaluate – with farmer 
participation – the performance of the new varieties 
and to report on results and recommend next steps 
and changes to improve the process. It is important 
to signal if the varieties are yielding – but for whom, 
and where, and under which management conditions.
■ Do farmers currently have access to formal sector seed 
(of improved varieties)? If not, why not?
• Is it a question of purchasing power? It is often the 
wealthier who seek out new varieties via certiﬁed 
seed.
• Might there be a lack of varieties useful for the 
farmers’ speciﬁc agro-ecological zones? Note that 
many new varieties are screened particularly for 
higher potential areas.
• Is the constraint related to lack of nearby distributors 
or distribution points? Formal seed stockists may 
tend to cluster in larger town centers.
■ Have farmers already experimented with new varieties?
• If so, with what results?
• If not, why not?
■ Are farmers aware that there are new varieties that 
may improve productivity or provide new market 
opportunities?
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Farmers’ Awareness of, Access to and  
Use of New Varieties: Guide Questions
An ‘improved’ variety 
does not guarantee  
better performance.  
Practitioners and  
farmers will want to  
be sure that the  
variety is adapted  
to the conditions  
on the ground.
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Count on a Multi-Year Process even for 
Interventions Spurred by Acute Stress
Clearly, the introduction of new varieties cannot 
be a one year, one-off activity. It is essential that 
the performance under farmer management of the 
new varieties informs subsequent recovery steps 
and that the response to future disasters also takes 
this information into account. Assuming that the 
objective is to strengthen and integrate farmers’ 
own seed systems, investment needs to be made to 
determine how to maintain the variety at least cost to 
farmers and how the seeds themselves can be made 
available and accessible on a continuing basis.
Introducing New Varieties in Contexts of 
Chronic or Prolonged Stress
Chronic and prolonged stress affects farmers who 
are subject to repeated ‘disaster’ situations such 
as frequent drought, or who experience slower 
stress build-ups, such as increases in pests and 
diseases over time. Many of these populations 
are also economically marginalized, trapped, and 
often facing destitution. Although introductions 
of improved varieties alone may not be enough to 
solve the underlying problems faced by these farm 
families, they can be both an effective addition and 
a useful entry point for more ambitious interventions 
to ensure longer-term development. Access by all 
farmers to adapted and appropriate plant material 
(including new variety introductions) is vital in these 
contexts. However, given the longer-term stress and 
the likelihood of such stresses recurring, the process 
for variety selection and introduction requires 
sustained and continuous commitment by scientists 
and farming communities alike.
 Chronically-stressed farmers are not economically 
attractive clients for seed companies (farmers 
just don’t have the needed cash) so the onus 
of maintaining varieties often rests with the 
communities themselves. 
 A number of key steps can help to make the 
introduction of new varieties in conditions of chronic 
stress an effective process and decrease the chances 
of failure. Note that the focus of Box 3 is a solidly 
developmental one.
Enabling Innovation
Marginal farmers in chronically-stressed areas are not 
commercially attractive clients. Therefore communities 
themselves have to be linked to research programs and 
should have access to research products. These links 
might be direct or through intermediary organizations 
such as NGOs and development organizations. In 
all cases, these links have to be made explicit – and 
institutionalized. Exposure to innovation needs to be 
continuous, not one-off.
■ Keep farmers, local seed producers, and agro-
entrepreneurs abreast of advances in breeding 
and give them access to a dynamic supply of 
promising new varieties.
■ In the particularly ‘hard case’ areas, where the 
adaptation stress is high (such as regions where 
soils are scarce or very poor) involve farmers 
in sustained participatory plant breeding and 
selection programs to ensure that the material 
is adapted on site and to secure a tradition of 
experimentation and direct client evaluation.
Support for the decentralized selection by farmers 
of preferred varieties (as well as their production 
and marketing) should be seen as part of a wider 
set of interventions to decentralize service delivery 
to farmers. The ultimate goal goes beyond varieties 
and seed. The aim is to enhance the capacity of 
communities to implement their own recovery and 
development in ways that mitigate the effects of 
cyclical and prolonged stress periods.
■ Conduct an analysis of the existing seed security 
situation with target communities and explore 
alternative solutions for solving well-deﬁned seed 
security constraints – and opportunities.
■ Expose farmers to a wide range of promising varieties of 
the target crops and do the testing under farmers’ own 
management conditions.
■ Help target communities to select varieties of their 
choice and to communicate back to extension and 
research the reasons for their preferences and 
selections. (Such feedback should also help to ﬁne-tune 
the breeding process.)
■ Support the multiplication of start-up materials. These 
include the foundation or basic seeds that are the origin 
stock of pure and clean varieties.
■ Encourage and support decentralized production and 
distribution of preferred varieties, for example through 
local traders and community-based seed multipliers. 
(Local seed producers might demonstrate and promote 
their products so as to create a sustained demand for 
preferred varieties.)
■ Enhance farmer capacity to produce seed for own use 
and for sale. (Such agro-enterprise skills can provide a 
real bridge toward income generation.)
■ Eventually, ensure diffusion of seed by building on 
existing seed channels, agro-enterprise initiatives, but 
also non-seed channels such as health and nutritional 
centers or soft drink kiosks etc. 
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Introducing New Varieties in Conditions of Chronic Stress: Key Steps
Understanding Seed Systems 
Used by Small Farmers in Africa: 
Focus on Markets
A great deal has been written on formal and informal
1 seed systems 
in Africa. However, the importance of the local seed/grain markets2 
has gone largely unrecognized and unappreciated as a distinct and 
expanding presence. This brief will introduce the formal and informal 
seed systems and highlight the growing importance of seed/grain markets for 
seed system stability and growth. It will also suggest concrete opportunities 
for greater integration of the formal and informal seed systems – centering 
on the strengthening of local markets during normal times as well as during 
disaster periods.
Formal and Informal Seed Systems
Farmers, particularly smallholder farmers, use many systems to access seeds.
 The formal seed system can be characterized by a clear chain of activities. 
It usually starts with plant breeding and promotes materials for formal variety 
release and maintenance. Regulations exist in this system to maintain variety 
identity and purity as well as to guarantee physical, physiological and sanitary 
quality. Seed marketing takes place through ofﬁcially recognized seed outlets, 
and by way of national agricultural research systems (Louwaars 1994) and 
even through relief seed programs. The central premise of the formal system 
is that there is a clear distinction between ‘seed’ and ‘grain’. Formal systems 
are especially important when seed is used to grow crops for commercial 
purposes (for example export or further food processing) and the uniformity 
and high quality of the product has to be guaranteed.
 The informal seed system is basically what the formal system is not. Seed-
related activities tend to be integrated and locally organized, and the informal 
system embraces most of the other ways in which farmers themselves 
produce, disseminate and procure seed: directly from their own harvest, 
through barter among friends, neighbors and relatives, and through local grain 
markets or traders. The same general steps take place in the informal system 
as in the formal but as integral parts of farmers’ grain production rather than 
as discrete activities. Local technical knowledge and standards guide informal 
seed system performance, including the prevailing market forces. Perhaps 
because of its local speciﬁcity to needs and preferences the informal system 
provides most of the seed farmers use, worldwide between 80% and 90% of 
stocks. The important exception concerns hybrid maize (see Box 1). 
 Figure 1 overleaf shows schematically the formal and informal dimensions 
of seed systems and how ﬂows of varieties and information between the two 
are routine.   
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1 The “informal system is sometimes also referred to as ‘local’, ‘farmer’, or ‘traditional’ seed systems.
2 We use the word ‘local’ seed/grain market to distinguish it from centralized more formal commercial 
enterprise. Seed arriving in the local markets is sometimes sourced from areas quite distant.
There are signiﬁcant 
opportunities 
to improve the 
integration of formal 
seed systems with 
seed/grain markets. 
These cluster around 
linking such markets 
to sources of new 
varieties, supporting 
training in seed 
production and 
providing business 
development services 
to emerging 
smaller-scale 
seed enterprises.
PRACTICE BRIEF6
2 Understanding Seed Systems Used by Small Farmers in Africa: Focus on Markets
 In East, Central and Southern Africa, informal 
and formal seed systems coexist and opinions 
diverge on the strengths and weaknesses of each. 
Proponents of informal seed systems often view the 
formal sector as a threat to crop system resilience 
and agrobiodiversity. Proponents of the formal seed 
system believe that commercial seed production 
is a prerequisite for sustained increases in crop 
productivity through the use of high quality seed 
of new3 varieties. Increasingly, however, there is a 
realization that farmers are sourcing less and less 
seed from their classic ‘informal’ source – their 
own stocks – and that this farmer seed is not being 
replaced by commercial seed. Rather, farmers are 
sourcing seed from local seed/grain markets. 
 In reference to markets, it is importance to 
distinguish between different types of seed/grain 
commerce. Local markets bring in grain, which 
is subsequently sorted and used by farmers for 
seed (hence the term ‘seed/grain markets’). This is 
different from commercial, formal sector seed, which 
is specially produced as seed, on specialized ﬁelds, 
within the framework of a seed business enterprise.
Growing Importance of Seed/Grain 
Markets: an Evolution in Perspective
For a long time it was believed that farmers would 
buy seed on the local market only if they had failed to 
harvest own seed, or lost their stocks, or were unable 
to obtain seed from family, friends and neighbors. In 
Eritrea, for example, seed sourced in the market was 
commonly referred to as ‘beggars’ seed.
 However, over the past ﬁve years, practical seed 
system analysis has sharpened our understanding of 
the role of the local seed/grain market. Thinking has 
evolved along these lines:
■ Initial belief that sourcing seed in local markets 
was a symptom of the failure of the farmers’ own 
ability to produce seed from harvest.
It is hybrid maize that provides the exception to the rule in 
terms of local system seed use. Maize hybrids have been 
the main growth engine for formal sector seed and for 
proﬁtable commercial enterprise in Africa. Quite simply, 
maize lends itself to commercial seed production.
■ Maize outperforms other cereals (pearl millet, sorghum, 
upland rice) in high-potential, rain-fed agro-ecoregions. 
The area planted to maize is large and the demand for 
seed substantial.
■ Commercial (modern) maize varieties can signiﬁcantly 
outperform local (traditional) varieties across the better 
environments.
■ Genetic quality of commercial maize varieties 
(especially hybrids) erodes under farmer seed 
management (when seed production is integrated with 
crop production).
■ Hybrid maize seed production is technically complex, 
exceeding the management capacity of smallholder 
farmers.
Throughout Africa, governments and donors have 
supported the maize seed sector through breeding, 
extension, production subsidies and support to commercial 
seed enterprises. Large seed enterprises exist only where 
maize is an important commercial crop.
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Hybrid Maize: The Special African Case
FIGURE 1: Channels through which farmers source seed are depicted by the cylinders. Own seed stocks, exchange with other 
farmers and purchase through local grain markets constitute informal channels. Commercial seed stockists, government or 
research outlets and relief supplies constitute formal channels. Adapted from Almekinders and Louwaars (1999), appearing 
in Sperling, Cooper and Remington, forthcoming).
3 ‘New’ is used to denote a variety developed by breeders in the formal 
seed system. It is used instead of ‘modern’ and ‘improved.’ 
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■ Acceptance that market seed is an important 
complement to farmers’ own production and also 
to commercial, formal sector seed.
■ Realization that the market seed channels are 
relatively efﬁcient and that farmers rely on local 
market seed for sound reasons of convenience, 
availability of varieties, price and adequate 
quality.
Seed/Grain Markets: Reassessing  
Opportunities
Field analysis of seed systems has helped to 
question stereotypes and to identify opportunities 
rather than focus on constraints. Across Africa, 
market-related ﬁndings are demonstrating that:
■ Market-sourced seed (especially for self-
pollinated crops) serves as the core for seed 
security, especially among the more vulnerable 
farm families.
■ Local grain markets, from which farmers obtain 
seed, prove durable in stress periods (during 
drought, ﬂood and even instances of civil strife).
■ The genetic quality of seed sourced in markets 
is most often acceptable to farmers, as it is 
generally grown in nearby agro-ecological 
contexts that match their own needs.
■ The physiological and phytosanitary quality of 
seed purchased in local markets can be partially 
regulated (by sorting and acquisition from known 
contacts) and is often objectively good.
■ Local seed/grain markets are often important 
channels for moving new varieties. In fact, for 
some crops, local markets move new varieties 
more effectively than formal diffusion channels.
■ Markets prove to be a useful source for re-
accessing seed of desired types and quantities 
that had been lost or temporarily abandoned in 
times of stress.
 (See Sperling et al. 2004)
When analyzed within the context of the 
intensiﬁcation of farming systems, the shift away 
from own-saved seed and toward local seed/grain 
markets is not surprising – particularly if markets 
can deliver a desirable range of crops and varieties, 
on time, and at acceptable quality and price. Today, 
seed/grain markets are the major source of seed for 
many farmers in many different cropping systems 
in Africa (for example, beans in Burundi, groundnut 
in Senegal and Gambia and most crops in semi-arid 
eastern Kenya).
Towards Integration of Local Seed/
Grain Markets in Seed Sector Strategy
The Status Quo
Formal seed systems are presently poorly integrated 
with the local seed/grain channels. Formal systems 
are closely managed, from the development of 
varieties to multiplication and certiﬁcation to 
marketing by commercial outlets to farmers. One 
might read the formal strategy as consciously 
avoiding integration with local seed/grain markets.  
 The motive in doing so is to maximize 
commercial seed sales and company proﬁtability 
through sustained volume sales. It is not to reduce 
farmers’ costs or to maximize farmer return on seed 
investments. Hybrids are a good case in point. The 
advantage for the seller, the commercial enterprise, 
is that farmers have to buy seeds every year or 
every other year. 
Recurrent purchases 
by farmers are 
obviously important 
for the sustainability 
of the commercial 
seed system. When 
small quantities 
of seed from the 
formal sector enter 
the informal seed 
system and are 
then multiplied 
and recycled within 
social networks or acquired via grain markets, the 
revenues of the formal seed system remain low. 
 Perhaps because the strengths of local seed/
grain market channels are largely unrecognized 
(or actively denigrated) such channels receive no 
support from either governments, who bolster 
the formal seed system, or from NGOs, who tend 
to support farmer production for home or local 
community use. Consequently, and in spite of 
its signiﬁcance, the local seed/grain market has 
almost no formal access to new varieties, to basic 
(foundation) seed as an input, or to seed quality 
control services. In spite of this lack of support, 
there are dramatic examples of how quickly new 
varieties move through the local market system (for 
example beans in western Kenya and green grams 
in eastern Kenya), fueled by farmers’ word of mouth 
that the new varieties on offer locally really do 
perform.
Moving Forward Towards Integration in 
Normal and Emergency Periods
If farmer production is to be maintained and 
strengthened seed sector analysts and practitioners 
need to give considerable thought as to how to 
support the local seed/grain markets. There are 
signiﬁcant opportunities for better integrating the 
formal seed systems (and expertise) with the seed/
grain market channels. These broadly cluster around 
facilitating access of seed/grain markets to new 
varieties, providing training in seed production (with 
an emphasis on higher, but affordable, quality), and 
providing business development services to these 
emerging, smaller-scale enterprises. 
Traders and farmers’ 
groups need continuing 
support to enable them  
to play a greater role in 
delivering higher quality 
yet affordable seed via 
local channels.
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During Normal Times
During normal times, initiatives could usefully focus 
on improving both the variety and quality of seed 
sold in local markets, especially as this is proving to 
be a core source of seed for more vulnerable farm 
families. These include:
■ Greater support needs to be given to increasing 
the seed quality of crops and varieties in greatest 
demand at the markets. These may be local 
varieties or they may be new ones, but those 
supplying large quantities of seed/grain to the 
market need to be trained to produce better 
seed (which does not need to be certiﬁed). Up 
to now, such training has been localized in small 
community-based groups, often by development 
projects. General knowledge on targeted ways 
to raise seed quality has to be mainstreamed 
in farming 
communities.
■ Farmers and 
farmer groups 
need a good deal 
more training in 
agro-enterprise 
development. It 
is not enough to 
produce good 
seed. Such 
seed needs to 
bring proﬁts 
on a continual 
basis. The commercial sector has shied away 
from subsistence crops and open-pollinated 
varieties as the proﬁts are not sufﬁcient. Hence, 
communities have to diversify production among 
crops and varieties and, crucially, need to 
have ongoing supplies of new and appreciated 
materials to stimulate demand. 
■ In reference to the point above, direct links needs 
to be forged between variety innovators and those 
who can multiply and distribute seed at a decent 
price. Right now, new varieties ﬁlter through 
to communities unacceptably slowly. Research 
systems have to deliver new materials not only 
to seed parastatals and commercial communities 
but directly to important community-based nodes 
right across the country.
■ Traders and farmer groups need continued access 
to quality control support – which is enabling and 
not threatening. A trader who becomes known 
for truly good seed should eventually be able to 
garner worthwhile price margins.
Such integration would direct beneﬁts to farmers-
consumers, traders and potentially to national 
economies as production gains translate into 
increased revenues. The commercial seed sector 
could potentially beneﬁt too, but only if the exposure 
of farmers to modestly better quality seed creates 
demand for the highly specialized products proffered 
by commercial enterprise.
During Emergency
The link between strengthened seed/grain markets 
in normal times and in disaster is direct. Higher 
quality seed and improved access is better at all 
times. Concerted, ongoing market strengthening 
should herald changes in the way such markets are 
regarded during periods of stress and emergency. 
For too long, seed for disaster relief has been 
sourced from the commercial seed sector, and its 
quality is often dubious. (‘Commercial seed aid’ is 
often but grain from market, conditioned, packaged 
and re-labeled; see the eastern Kenya and Zimbabwe 
cases in Brief No. 2).
 Local seed/grain markets can increasingly be 
made use of in disaster response via distribution 
of vouchers, cash, or a combination of vouchers 
and seed fairs. In the past, such systems have 
delivered sufﬁcient seed and seed of acceptable 
crops, varieties and quality. Local markets are also 
important features in regional economies. They need 
to be supported, not undermined, particularly in 
stress periods.
 In sum, we need to look at local seed/grain 
markets as opportunities rather than constraints. 
With more targeted alliances, such markets can be 
crucial for moving new varieties from the formal 
sector more rapidly and more widely. With strategic 
support the products that local seed/grain markets 
offer can change from being ‘farmer-acceptable and 
known’ to ‘much better than what the farmers have 
in their hands’. Finally, because the local seed/
grain markets are so crucial to farmers’ welfare, 
improvements in normal times immediately translate 
into improvements during periods of stress.
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Market-sourced seed, 
particularly for 
self-pollinated crops, 
serves as the core for 
seed security, especially 
among more vulnerable 
farm families.
Assessing Seed System Security
This brief maps the steps needed to assess seed security system and is intended for non-specialist emergency response practitioners and donors. It presents a number of insights that have evolved through recent research. The brief seeks to: 
■ Expose stakeholders to agriculture disaster assessment methods, with a 
focus on seed systems.
■ Facilitate changes in knowledge, attitude and practice with regard to seed 
system security.
■ Assist in identifying strategies for rapid and effective agricultural recovery.
 
Seed systems are complex and so are the impacts of interventions. Every 
organization approaches a situation with a unique set of values, experience 
and commitment. While the assessment approach presented here aims to 
promote a rigorous seed system security assessment (SSSA), we realize that 
actual practice is often rushed and based on less-than-perfect information and 
judgments. This tool may help practitioners to avoid some common shortfalls 
and promote reﬂection on how seed systems function. 
 This brief identiﬁes the key seed security issues. Although the intention is 
to provide guidance to help practitioners move forward, certain institutions 
may, after reading this brief, decide not to do seed aid at all, but rather 
to leave such assistance to others with greater capacity. In general, it is 
probably preferable to offer seed aid only in concert with seed system security 
assessments.
 Note that this brief is an excerpt from a larger manual (see below for full 
details); our aim here is simply to introduce the concept of SSSA and give an 
overview of process.
The State of Seed Security Assessments
Farm families are seed secure when they have access to seed and planting 
material of adequate quantity, acceptable quality and in time for planting. 
Seed security is best framed within the broader context of food and livelihood 
security. Helping farmers to obtain the planting materials they need will 
enable them to produce for their own consumption as well as for sale.
 Achieving seed security is quite different from attaining food security, 
despite their obvious links. One can have enough seed to sow a plot, but 
lack sufﬁcient food to eat, for example during the ‘hungry season’ prior to 
harvest. Conversely, a household can have adequate food, but lack access to 
seed for planting. Despite these important differences between food security 
and seed security, determinations of seed security are invariably based, 
implicitly or explicitly, on food security assessments. This results from a lack 
of appreciation and understanding of seed security issues, caused in part by 
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The steps 
needed to attain 
seed security are 
quite different 
from those needed 
for food security. 
Explicit seed system 
security assessments 
are a prerequisite 
for effective 
action and vital 
for determining 
the strategic goals 
for seed-related 
assistance.
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a paucity of methods for assessing seed security in 
either emergency situations (that is, rapidly) or in 
depth on a larger scale beyond the community level.
 Below we present the basic steps for a seed 
system security assessment. We note ﬁrst that the 
context for any SSSA must 
ﬁrst be well understood 
before one homes in 
on the agricultural or 
seed system per se. The 
patterns and causes of 
the disaster, for example 
its timing and duration 
and distribution in space 
and across communities, 
have to be analyzed and 
mapped. Further, the broad 
effects on the ﬁve capitals (natural, human, social, 
ﬁnancial and physical) need to be well understood 
(see the detailed CIAT/CRS document for a set of 
guide questions). This brief is restricted to seed 
security concerns to draw attention to this relatively 
new area of assessment.
Basic Elements for Assessing  
Seed System Security
Methods for seed system security assessment are 
in the process of being tested and reﬁned under 
the OFDA/MFA-funded Seed Systems under Stress 
project. A number of basic elements are integral for 
an accurate assessment of seed security.
 Box 1 shows the ﬁve main elements in a seed 
system security analysis, with the subsequent 
text brieﬂy highlighting key points in each. While 
presented sequentially, the process is iterative, 
going back and forth as one starts to understand 
what is really going on. The analysis is geared 
particularly to areas of acute shock (emergency), 
although most elements would also be relevant 
for agricultural and seed systems that are more 
chronically stressed.
Carry Out Quick Farming Systems 
and Seed System Proﬁle for Regions 
of Concern: Normal Times 
As a ﬁrst step to understanding seed security, one 
has to have a good grasp of how the farming system 
and the seed system function in normal times; that 
is, what was the status quo. Much of this information 
can be gathered pre-disaster, through desk-based 
research and by informant or focus group interviews. 
The agricultural and seed system basics are 
straightforward:
■ What are farmers’ most important crops in 
normal times? What do they use them for? 
Consumption, income or both? What lesser  
crops might become important in times of  
stress?
■ How do farmers’ usually get seed or planting 
material for these crops?
■ What are the sowing basics for each major crop? 
(Average areas sown, seed rates, multiplication 
rates.)
■ Are there important or preferred varieties, by 
crop?
■ Which inputs and management practices might 
be essential for particular crops or varieties?
■ Who within the household is responsible for 
decision-making and actual management of the 
diverse crops, at various stages of production and 
post-production?
 Some of the answers to these questions may be 
valid across households and socioeconomic groups, 
while others may not. So, repeating the analysis 
for distinct types of households or target groups, 
for example female-headed households, could be 
important. Some of these answers may also vary 
by ethnic group, and certainly will vary by agro-
ecological region, so that doing an assessment in a 
small area will not be appropriate for country-wide 
interventions. We brieﬂy elaborate on several of 
these items to show how decision-making can  
start to unfold even in routine information  
collection. 
Important Crops (normal and stress)
Not all crops are equally important for farmers’ 
livelihoods. A quick analysis can highlight the central 
ones, both for direct consumption and for income 
(the latter being crucial for purchase of survival 
1. Carry out quick farming system and seed system 
proﬁles for regions of concern: normal times.
2. Determine the goals for seed relief and recovery, 
including farmer demand and needs: post crisis.
AFTER DYNAMIC DEMANDS AND NEEDS HAVE BEEN 
DETERMINED:
3. Analyze seed channel functioning post-crisis 
(framed in relation to demands and needs set).
4. Probe for more chronic (versus acute) stress 
manifestations as well as for emerging development 
opportunities – so as to distinguish between 
immediate and longer-term needs and strategies.
5. Match possible responses to priority constraints, 
opportunities and demands.
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Five Basic Elements
1STEPA shortfall in 
production does 
not necessarily 
imply a seed 
shortfall.
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items in times of stress). Note that the proﬁle of 
crops will change by season. The general proﬁle of 
crops might also alter in stress periods – and these 
minor crop variations can usually be anticipated. 
Finally, as crops critical for poorer farmers may not 
be the same as for the better off, it is often useful to 
focus on the more vulnerable population segments 
immediately. 
TABLE 1
Most important crops, theoretical example  
for East Africa
CROP For Consumption For Income Other (Specify)
Beans +
Sorghum + + (beer)
Maize +
How (through which channels) farmers normally 
obtain seed for these most important crops
Farmers normally get seed from a range of channels, 
even for the same crop. For example, a farmer 
might get some of her bean seed from own stocks, 
and some from local markets to top up inadequate 
home harvest or storage conditions. The use 
of multiple seed channels for the same crop is 
important because a failure of one channel can be 
compensated for by using another.
 Seed for different crops, for example maize and 
sorghum, may also routinely be accessed through 
quite different channels. For example, hybrid maize 
might need to be accessed from the formal sector 
or commercial sellers, while seed for sorghum can 
easily be obtained from home harvests because its 
multiplication rate is high and the harvest can be 
directly used for seed. 
 Through time, the range of channels from which 
farmers access seed may change, as more integrated 
seed suppliers emerge, such as informal traders 
who move higher quality (but still not certiﬁed) 
seed. Similarly, with increasingly poverty, relief seed 
is becoming routine in many contexts. Hence it is 
important to be aware of the full range of channels 
that farmers use and to keep up-to-date on changes 
over time.
Are there important or preferred varieties  
(by crop)?
Different varieties may serve different purposes in 
a single household. While certain varieties may be 
preferred for home 
consumption, 
others may be 
preferred for sale. 
Elements of post-
harvest processing, 
such as ease of 
threshing, may 
cause women to 
prefer different 
varieties from 
men. The role of 
different varieties 
may vary across households, reﬂecting, inter alia, 
differences in agro-ecological and socio-economic 
conditions. For example, households with easy 
access to markets may access fertilizers and 
pesticides, thereby making a variety with traits such 
as tolerance to local production constraints (for 
example pests and poor soils) less relevant. Note 
also that the relevance of different varieties may 
change through time, even within a household,  
for example as socio-economic conditions  
change.
Determine the Goals for Seed Relief 
and Recovery, Including Farmer 
Demand and Needs: Post Crisis
One of the early steps to shaping a seed system 
security assessment centers on weighing the 
objectives for relief and recovery. It is only with 
this strategic reﬂection that practitioners increase 
their chance of meeting the needs of populations 
in stress. Strategic reﬂection is vitally important 
and should replace the simple response of merely 
delivering inputs such as seed, which may or may 
CROP Own Production Social Networks, Neighbors & Friends Local markets Formal Sector
Other
(Specify)
Beans 50 5 45
Sorghum 95 5
Maize 20 80
TABLE 2 
Seed sources (percent from different sources) for most important crops, theoretical example for East Africa
2STEP
For many crops, small 
farmers are increasingly 
obtaining their seed  
off-farm through local 
vendors and markets.
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not be appropriate for 
the context and, even if 
appropriate, may not be 
used for other reasons. 
 In considering 
objectives, practitioners 
may either elect to 
restore the system to the 
status quo ante (as it was 
before) or actively aim to 
promote a different and 
presumably improved crop and agricultural system. 
In planning either thrust, it is necessary to ensure 
that the response addresses immediate needs and 
demand. The rationale for this Step 2 is that the 
aims of the relief and recovery should be considered 
explicitly – so that the SSSA is shaped to maximize 
understanding of the dynamics (constraints and 
opportunities) in the systems. 
 Several points merit consideration. First, farming 
systems are not static: rather they are dynamic 
and change in positive as well as negative ways. 
Secondly, one cannot intervene in the full farming 
system, across all crops; choices have to be made 
as to whether the crop focus should promote quick 
recovery or maximize return on investment. Third is 
the principle of ‘Do No Harm’. A response may do 
a disservice to stressed populations – reinforcing 
vulnerability – if it restores a system that is gradually 
deteriorating. Finally, it has to be made clear from 
the outset to which groups the SSSA gives priority 
(Farmers? Seed companies? Traders? Others?)
 Box 2 suggests the kinds of guiding questions 
needed to frame the setting of aims.
The following presents guidance as to whether the goal of 
the intervention should be to restore the agricultural system 
to its pre-crisis status quo, or if it should aim at promoting 
a different (and presumably improved) system.
OVERVIEW
■ What are the strengths and weaknesses of the pre-crisis 
cropping and seed system practices?
■ Are the crops and varieties that people can access 
generally appropriate?
■ Do people have access to markets for inputs and 
produce?
■ Are there social networks and institutions that function 
to diffuse knowledge and planting material?
■ Is there a culture of experimentation and evaluation with 
new seed?
■ Are people eager to explore new niches such as seed 
trading?
■ What opportunities exist that can be exploited?
■ What changes are already taking place that shape crop 
and variety proﬁles, and with what effects?
 If strengths and opportunities exist and predominate, 
an overall aim for any intervention should be to ‘do no 
harm’. Changing a system may put existing strengths at 
risk. However, if sound changes are already going on, these 
changes may be undermined by interventions that aim to 
restore the pre-crisis status.
GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO 
THE STATUS QUO ANTE
■ If the aim is to restore, should the focus of intervention 
be on the income-generating crops, the staple crops, or 
crops that are key for system resilience, and why?
■ Which crops have been affected most by the crisis? 
Should the focus be on these? Why? Why not?
■ Are the crops affected critical for immediate 
food security? Are there no substitutes (or other 
opportunities) locally to ﬁll the gap? 
GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE CROP, SEED 
OR AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM
■ What evidence is there that change is needed? What 
types of change? 
■ What should the level of effort on strengthening be in 
relation to efforts on system restoration? What strengths 
and opportunities exist in the surviving system that can 
be exploited? (See above)
■ Should the crops of intervention focus be the same as 
before? Why? Should there be a partial combination of 
old and new crops? Note that the introduction of a new 
crop implies the identiﬁcation of a new market.
■ Should crop diversiﬁcation be promoted as an explicit 
strategy?
■ Should the priority varieties of intervention focus be 
the same as before? Why? Should there be a partial 
combination of old and new varieties?
■ Is there evidence of seed quality concerns? How might 
these be addressed?
■ Is there evidence of accessibility of novel crops and 
varieties? Bottlenecks, or otherwise, in formal sector, 
local seed/grain markets and exchange networks?
■ What are the risks involved in the strengthening 
strategy? How might they be anticipated and responded 
to? 
RESPONDING TO IMMEDIATE FARMER DEMAND
Focusing on farmers and local economy trends, is there 
evidence for shifts in immediate demand and needs?
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Deﬁning a Strategy for Relief and Recovery: Guide Questions
A response may 
do a disservice to 
stressed populations 
if it restores a system 
that is gradually 
deteriorating.
PRACTICE BRIEF 7
SEED AID FOR SEED SECURITY ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS 5
Analyze Seed Channel Functioning: 
Post-Crisis 
This step provides the core of the seed system 
security assessment. Some channels may be more 
resilient to different kinds of stress than others, and 
one should not assume that a breakdown in one 
channel means a breakdown in all. So, for instance, 
in times of bureaucratic upheaval such as civil war, 
when government services may halt, formal channels 
like seed parastatals often cease to function, while 
local ones, such as the seed/grain markets, often 
continue to operate. 
 In assessing seed channel functioning, three 
basic dimensions of seed security need to be 
evaluated to understand seed system functioning 
(see Brief No. 3 and Table 3 above).
Seed availability: Is seed available in the area? 
Access to seed: Can farmers access the seed, 
particularly in terms of price and distance?
Seed quality: Is seed of the right variety? Is it 
sufﬁciently clean and healthy? Will use of this seed 
introduce unwarranted risk? 
 A channel is functioning (or can be helped 
to function) only when all three features can be 
managed to farmers’ satisfaction. Very often during 
a crisis one may have to think hard about how to 
weigh each of these features. Minimally, enough 
seed has to be made accessible for basic sowing. 
The issues often most hotly debated include ‘of 
which crops and varieties’, and ‘of what quality’.
Key Insights for Assessing Seed  
Channel Functioning
In the majority of cases, for poorer farmers, two 
channels in particular merit focus in stress periods: 
seed sourced from home production and from local 
seed/grain markets.
Home Production
The important message concerning home production 
(that is seed derived from own harvests) is that a 
production shortfall does not necessarily imply a 
seed shortfall. Crops have different seeding rates 
(that is, the amount of seed required to sow a given 
area) and different multiplication rates (that is, the 
amount of seed harvested in relation to the amount 
of seed sown). As an example, in East Africa for 
some of the basic staples, like beans or sorghum, 
farmers can lose most of the harvest (for beans 88% 
and for sorghum even 99%) and still have enough 
seed to sow – assuming all crop harvested can be 
saved for actual planting. But note that saving seed 
is not always easy, particularly in areas with only one 
agricultural season per year.
TABLE 4
The relation between harvests (home production) 
and seed needed for sowing, theoretical example  
for East Africa.
Crop Beans Sorghum
Surface Area per household 1/4 ha 1/4 ha
Seeding Rates (kg/ha) 100 10
Sowing Needs 25 kg 2.5 kg
Multiplication Rates 8 100
Harvest 200 kg 250 kg
% of harvest needed to meet 
basic sowing needs 12.5 1.0
3STEP
Crop Availability(high to low)
Access
(easy to difﬁcult)
Variety & Physiological Quality  
(acceptable or not)
Own production and home 
stocks low easy acceptable
Local grain/seed markets high difﬁcult (high price) moderately acceptable: variety is adapted but seed is of medium physiological quality
Formal Sector low difﬁcult
moderately acceptable: variety is not totally 
suited to marginal zones, but seed is of high 
physiological quality
TABLE 3
Rating the parameters, bean example.
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Local Markets
Analyses that show how farmers actually obtain 
seed, both in normal and stress times, also deliver 
an important message about local markets. For 
many crops, small farmers are increasingly obtaining 
their seed through local vendors and markets, 
either to top up their home supplies, or to obtain 
the bulk of their seed, because they felt forced (or 
chose) to eat their household stocks. This trend 
toward market purchase is being documented again 
and again as land holdings become smaller and 
more fragmented, and as soil fertility progressively 
declines, particularly in East, Central and Southern 
Africa. The key question for understanding seed 
security thus shifts from ’do farmers produce enough 
seed‘ to ’can farmers access seed elsewhere’. 
Assessing how markets function involves tracing the 
locations of seeds and the paths along which seed 
moves in a stressed region, the availability of seed at 
important markets, transport and time costs, and the 
price at which seed is ultimately put on offer locally. 
Interviews with key regional traders can be especially 
useful for understanding the position of seed stocks 
and price margins (and this can be done quickly). 
Again, case studies are showing that for most basic 
crops it is rare that seed is not available within 
reasonable trading vicinity – even in time of crisis.
Probe for More Chronic (versus 
Acute) Stress Manifestations as 
well as for Emerging Development 
Opportunities 
The last key step – before analyzing possible 
responses – centers on looking at the longer-term, 
so as to understand what is actually happening 
at the present moment. If the focus remains on 
the acute or short-term, SSSA may fail to grasp 
ongoing processes and dynamism in the system, 
and subsequently may misdiagnose the real set 
of local strengths and weaknesses. An SSSA has 
to systematically probe for longer-term patterns 
and key signals, which enlighten seed system 
functioning. 
4STEP
SEED AVAILABLITY
■ Do farmers lament a general shortage of any seed or 
planting material of a speciﬁc crop, which forces them 
to plant smaller areas than they wish?
■ If so, do they cite reasons for these crops and varieties 
not being available locally? Marketing problems 
perhaps? Poor transport? (If farmers complain of high 
price, or not having funds to buy what is on offer, this 
reﬂects a problem of access.)
SEED ACCESSIBILITY
■ Do farmers complain of high seed prices, or cost of seed 
in general, which has forced signiﬁcant changes in their 
agricultural strategy, such as planting smaller areas, 
using non-preferred seed or changing the area planted 
to different crops?
■ Do farmers mention decline of seed bartering networks 
that gave them access to seed and no local market 
mechanism to ﬁll the gap and deliver the seed they 
want?
SEED QUALITY 
■ Are farmers planting what they consider unadapted 
(or ‘inferior’) crop varieties because they cannot ﬁnd 
anything better (crops with low yields, wrong cycles, 
poor taste, poor marketing qualities)?
■ Are farmers planting what they consider low quality 
seed because they cannot ﬁnd anything better?
■ Do farmers continually have to resow ﬁelds because of 
germination or emergence failures?
GENERAL CONCERNS
■ Do farmers comment on a decline of seed quantity, 
quality or accessibility over the longer-term? (Maybe 
take a 5 to 10 season view.) If so, why? Are these 
problems they feel they cannot solve?
■ Have the farmers been the recipients of seed aid on 
a repeated and relatively regular basis (say 1 in 3 
seasons)? If so, why?
■ Are there farmers who exhibit ‘positive deviancy’? That 
is, who always have seed available, who never have a 
problem accessing seed and who are satisﬁed with the 
varieties and the quality of their seed? Why are these 
farmers seed secure and what can one learn from them?
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
■ Do promising new varieties exist for the agro-
ecosystems in question, and do farmers have access 
to them? (Aim to understand how farmers use new 
varieties and under what circumstances.)
■ Have there been positive trends in crop choice and 
evolution? If so, for whom? What were the conditions for 
success and how can these be sustained further?
■ Have agro-enterprises been developed regionally? If so, 
what were the salient features for start up and success? 
(Try to analyze also those that may have failed.)
B
O
X
 3 Guide Questions for Looking at the Longer-Term: Chronic Stress?  
Developmental Opportunities?
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 Threshold or trigger indicators that might signal 
chronic stress include:
■ Aid is being given season after season, in 
absence of acute outside stress such as  
ﬂoods.
■ Crop failure, and purported lack of seed, becomes 
cyclical, say every 2 to 3 years.
■ Lack of seed stored in houses and communities 
where it is normally maintained in quantity.
■ Dramatic declines in seed quality and viability, 
or farmers sowing seed that they know to be of 
signiﬁcantly inferior quality for germination rate 
or plant health.
■ Changing crop proﬁles because of a lack of a 
particular seed or crop.
■ Sharp increases in use of non-preferred or 
disliked varieties. 
On the more developmental side, similarly, key 
signals can serve to stimulate reﬂections. Note that 
possible seed system strengthening might be framed 
both to respond to existing problems and to explore 
novel opportunities. In terms of opportunities, trigger 
signals on the more developmental side might 
include:
■ Lack of farmer awareness of, access to, or use of 
new varieties (see also Brief No. 5).
■ Heavy reliance on a narrow range of subsistence 
crops.
■ Lack of agro-enterprise in general (with most crop 
production for local consumption and sale.
 
Box 3 (opposite) suggests guide questions to help 
assess whether seed systems are stressed on a more 
chronic basis and to suggest ways to start to explore 
more developmental options that go beyond short-
term responses to emergencies.
Parameter of the 
problem Short-term response (acute) Long-term response (chronic)
Unavailability of seed
Where farmers source seed predominately 
through informal seed channels:
Enhance immediate operation of local and 
regional markets (e.g. offer inventory credit to 
traders, facilitate improved access to market 
information, including advance notice of 
demand subsidies or of purchase).
Where farmers source seed predominately 
through formal seed channels:
Direct distribution of seed.
Where farmers source seed predominately 
through informal seed channels:
Support development of local and regional 
markets (e.g. encourage more access to credit, 
better established market information channels, 
perhaps more effective transport and seed 
storage support).
Where farmers source seed predominately 
through formal seed channels:
Support development of quality assured 
seed production or supply chains, including 
commercial enterprises where viable.
Poor and vulnerable 
farmers do not have 
access to seed
Cash disbursement.
Seed Fairs with vouchers or cash.
Local procurement and distribution (if 
the disaster rendered the communities 
dysfunctional).
Poverty reduction programs.
Seed of poor 
quality and lack of 
appropriate varieties
Seed fairs with quality controls. 
Direct distribution of test samples of quality 
seed or sale of subsidized test samples.
Distribution of foundation seed to a limited 
number of farmers, making use of informal 
seed channels to diffuse the seed to others.
Programs to improve seed quality (on farm and 
in seed/grain markets).
Participatory variety selection.
Participatory plant breeding.
TABLE  5
Seed problems and broadly appropriate responses
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Match Possible Responses to 
Priority Constraints, Opportunities 
and Demand
Finally, the strength of the assessment (its accuracy, 
comprehensiveness and scope) must be double-
checked via the reﬂective process of linking problem 
deﬁnitions and concrete action on the ground. The 
SSSA should be sufﬁcient to guide subsequent ﬁeld 
action and to help weigh among a variety (or cluster) 
of options. The process of pondering responses will 
reveal the extent to which information is sufﬁcient, 
and whether the dynamics of seed system function 
are truly understood. 
 Without prescribing a scenario such as ’If A is 
found, then B response is appropriate’, we suggest 
in Table 5 below the broad overview of possible seed 
system-related problems and how they may link to 
possible alleviating actions (see CIAT/CRS ms. for 
an in-depth table). For instance, during an acute 
crisis such as a ﬂood, an assessment that shows 
a ‘lack of seed available’ (a rare case) might be 
immediately linked to actions to import seed from 
elsewhere, whereas an assessment that diagnoses 
‘lack of access’ as the problem (perhaps due to 
a drop in ability to purchase or to barter) might 
focus on supplying vouchers (perhaps coupled 
with seed fairs). Assessments that show the stress 
to be a chronic one, spanning many seasons, 
might recommend a move away from seed-based 
interventions altogether. In the case of chronic 
access problems, the development of income-
generating activities or agro-enterprises might better 
help alleviate the poverty problems at hand.
Conclusions
New insights on seed aid and an appreciation of 
the resilience and complexity of seed systems are 
emerging. This has resulted in a signiﬁcant ‘raising 
of the bar’ in how seed system security is assessed 
and analyzed and how seed interventions are 
designed.
 A seed system security assessment, not 
surprisingly, focuses on seed systems. It therefore 
does not replace disaster and food security 
assessments, but rather it complements them. SSSA 
itself also goes well beyond a seed focus per se 
and beyond reductionist calculations of seed needs. 
SSSA is an iterative process – part desk-based, part 
ﬁeld analysis – with reﬂections on short- as well as 
long-term trends in the seed, farming and livelihood 
systems. 
 This brief introduces a tool that practitioners 
can use to assist farming communities recover 
from disaster. It provides concrete guidance 
for understanding problems and identifying 
opportunities for strengthening and integrating the 
different seed systems on which farm families rely. 
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5STEP
Seed Relief Responses:  
an Overview
This Brief describes the predominant approaches to seed aid used to respond to acute, emergency stresses. Such approaches generally either deliver direct forms of aid and assume a lack of available seed as the driving need, or are market-based and give recipients cash or 
vouchers to procure seed and hence assume lack of access as the driving need. 
(These distinctions are discussed in more detail in Brief No. 3.) This Brief looks 
at the range of interventions, suggests some of their strengths and weaknesses, 
and highlights how they are evolving over time.
Direct Aid Approaches
Direct seed aid generally engages implementers in procuring, transporting 
and distributing seed. Direct Seed Distribution, its main variant, is the oldest 
form of seed aid and has been practiced, at least in Africa, for more than 20 
years. Food aid that is given explicitly to protect seed stocks (known as Seed 
Protection Rations) might also be included in this category. We brieﬂy discuss 
these direct aid approaches below.
Direct Seed Distribution
Direct Seed Distribution (DSD) is the dominant approach to seed relief. It 
is sometimes referred to as seeds and tools (S&T) because the distribution 
of seed is often accompanied by the provision of a hand hoe, and is also 
known as conventional seed aid, denoting its longstanding position as the 
standard response. DSD is a classic supply-side approach; the implementing 
agency decides what quantities of which crops and varieties to purchase and 
to distribute as a package to farmers. It is based on an assumption that the 
problem is a lack of available seed or of seed quality; although seed might be 
available, it is considered to be of inferior varieties or of poor quality. Tenders 
are issued for commercial seed, if available in the country, or for farmer seed 
if not. This might be done by the concerned government, by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) or by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
The transport and distribution of the seed is usually undertaken by NGOs who 
may already be engaged in distributing relief supplies (food and non-food). 
DSD approaches differ mainly in the source from which they procure seed 
– the commercial sector or farmer-based systems (see Bramel et al. 2004).
Commercial Seed-Based DSD
Direct seed distribution based on commercial seed is widely used in countries 
with a commercial maize seed sector such as Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda 
and Zimbabwe. This may be because governments use the relief opportunity 
to promote their seed industry. However, it has also been used in southern 
Sudan, where there is no formal seed system, with seed sourced in neighboring 
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Responses to seed 
relief are changing, 
from a historic 
dominance of direct 
seed distribution 
(previously called 
seeds & tools) 
to market-based 
options. While 
direct aid assumes 
‘lack of available 
seed’ as the 
driving need, the 
market-based 
approaches, focus 
on concerns 
of ‘lack of access.’ 
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Uganda and Kenya. Seed is procured either from 
government seed parastatals or from private 
companies who procure certiﬁed seed of varieties 
that have been developed by private or public sector 
research. 
 Commercially-based DSD by its nature is restricted 
to a narrow range of crops and varieties that the seed 
business sector has deemed potentially proﬁtable. 
Many of these crop and variety types have been 
selected for medium and high potential environments, 
or may be hybrids, because the commercial sector 
is geared towards those farmers who can afford to 
pay for new varieties or who seek to renew their seed 
stocks regularly.
Farmer Seed-Based DSD
Direct Seed Distribution is not based on the 
commercial sector in countries such as Ethiopia, 
Eritrea and Burundi because the commercial sector 
there is nonexistent or too small to meet the relief 
demand or because the government discourages 
the importation of seed into the country. In these 
countries, DSD consists of sourcing seed from 
the farmers directly, via larger-scale traders, or by 
purchases in grain markets. In farmer-based DSD 
(as with commercial-based DSD) implementing 
agencies decide on crops, varieties and their relative 
quantities. Tenders are issued, seed is purchased, 
aggregated, transported and distributed to farmers.
DIRECT AID APPROACHES
1.  Direct Seed Distribution: 
Commercial-Based 
a.k.a Convention Seed Aid, 
Seeds and tools.
Procurement of quality seed from outside the region, for delivery to farmers. The 
most widely used approach to seed relief. 
Short-term response best suited to address problems of seed availability especially 
in situations of total crop failure and long-term displacement of farmers.
2.  Direct Seed Distribution: 
Farmer-based or Local 
procurement and distribution 
of seed.
Procurement of quality seed from within the region, for delivery to farmers, a variant 
of 1.
Short-term response to address problems of seed access or highly localized 
problems of seed availability.
3.  Food aid, Seed Protection 
Ration.
Food aid is often supplied in emergency situations alongside seed aid so that the 
farming family does not need to consume the seed provided or to eat their remaining 
seed stocks.
MARKET-BASED AID APPROACHES
4.  Vouchers and cash to farmers.
Vouchers or cash are provided so as to give farmers the means to access seed where 
it is available, from local markets or the commercial sector. Farmers can access 
crops and varieties of their choice. 
Short-term response to address problems of seed access especially in situations of 
local seed shortages where local markets or barter between farmers are normally 
used.
5.  Seed Fairs.
Seed fairs provide an ad hoc market place to facilitate access to seeds of speciﬁc 
crops and varieties, from other farmers, traders, and the formal sector. Usually used 
in conjunction with vouchers to provide poorer farmers with purchasing power.
Short or medium-term response to address problems of seed access especially for 
subsistence crops, and where local markets are normally used.
6. Trade-Input, Multi-Input, 
Livelihood Fairs.
A variant of 5. In addition to seed, such fairs facilitate farmers’ access to inputs such 
as small livestock, animal feed, fertilizer and tools. 
TABLE 1
Range of seed relief approaches used in periods of acute emergency stress
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 The fact that seed can be successfully sourced 
from the farmer seed system during direct seed 
distributions provides prima facie evidence that there 
is no problem of seed availability in the countries and 
regions in question, although there may be pockets of 
problems, for which local procurement is necessary. 
Supply-side interventions like DSD are generally 
misplaced in such situations.
Food Aid and Seed Protection Rations
The delivery of food aid may be underrated as a 
seed relief strategy. Delivery of food aid can allow 
farmers to retain, rather than eat, their remaining 
seed stocks. The rationale for the Seed Protection 
Ration is that such food aid is given particularly for 
the months prior to sowing, during the lean times.
Market-Based Approaches
Market-based approaches focus on giving farmers 
the means to obtain seed. They are based on the 
assumption that seed access, not seed availability, 
is the primary constraint. The use of seed vouchers, 
coupled with seed fairs, is the most common 
response in this genre. The seed focus has also 
recently expanded to embrace ‘Trade-Input’ or 
‘Multi-Input’ or ‘Livelihood’ Fairs. Furthermore, giving 
vouchers or cash alone, without an accompanying 
fair, is increasingly being practiced as a seed aid 
strategy.
Seed Vouchers and Fairs
Seed vouchers are coupons or certiﬁcates with 
a guaranteed cash value that can be exchanged 
for seed from approved sellers. Seed sellers then 
redeem their vouchers for cash from the issuing 
agency. The Seed Voucher and Fair approach 
(SV&F) brings seed sellers together on a speciﬁc 
set of days and in a well-advertised local venue and 
then allows farmers who need seeds to select the 
crops and varieties they want. The SV&F approach 
is fairly recent in terms of an emergency response 
and was ﬁrst implemented in July 2000 in Kenya 
(see Remington et al. 2002). However, its use has 
been scaled up quickly and as of 2005 had been 
implemented in some 30 African countries.
Trade-Input, Multi-Input or Livelihood Fairs
Several variants on seed fairs give farmers access 
to a range of inputs beyond seed, such as small 
livestock, animal feed, fertilizer and tools. Vouchers 
are issued, and sellers and buyers come together in 
dedicated aid events.
Cash or Vouchers Alone
Voucher distribution alone has been used in a 
range of aid contexts, for services as well as goods: 
medicines, tools, food and other items vulnerable 
populations might need. Their use linked to seed is 
somewhat more recent, and ultimately allows the 
recipients to decide whether seed of any kind is a 
priority for them.
 Cash-based aid also has been around for 
decades, but work comparing the effectiveness of 
cash to vouchers and to direct aid approaches is 
fairly new. The ﬁrst conclusions suggest that direct 
cash compares favorably with all alternatives, 
including food aid itself (see Harvey 2005).
 Table 1 summarizes the range of seed relief 
approaches used in periods of acute emergency 
stress. (Modiﬁed from Anon. 2004 FAO).
Comparing the Dominant Forms of Aid: 
DSD and SV&F
No one approach to seed aid is inherently better 
than another. Much depends on features such as 
the nature of the emergency (man-made or natural), 
the seed security problems encountered and the 
capacities of the implementing agencies. Below 
we outline some of the salient advantages and 
disadvantages associated with the two dominant 
forms of seed aid: Direct Seed Distribution and Seed 
Vouchers & Fairs. 
Advantages
Main advantages of Direct Seed Distribution:
1.  It exploits the existing disaster relief system and 
capacity. 
 Governments, donors and relief agencies have 
well established procurement processes and 
accountability systems. Seed can be treated as 
any other commodity, such as food, blankets, 
tarpaulins etc. Tenders are issued, sealed bids 
accepted, seed is purchased, transported and 
distributed.
2.  It is easy to scale up quickly.
 If seed is available, it can be sourced, transported 
and distributed to large numbers of farmers in a 
short period of time.
3.  It supports the formal seed system. 
 The purchase of commercial seed is very 
proﬁtable to seed companies because orders 
are large, NGOs pay up front and they also 
handle transport and distribution. It is especially 
lucrative when seed companies can purchase and 
condition grain to sell as ‘emergency grade’  
seed.
4.  It is an opportunity to ﬁnance the large scale 
dissemination of seed of new promising research 
varieties. Seed of new varieties reaches many 
more farmers more quickly than through the 
commercial channels.
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Main advantages of Seed Vouchers & Fairs:
1.  SV&F builds and strengthens local farmer 
systems. 
 Although recovering from disaster, demand by 
farmers for seed is usually constrained by their 
lack of ﬁnancial capital. Increasing demand by 
issuing vouchers enables farmers to access seed 
from a range of sources such as other farmers, 
market traders and the commercial seed sector. 
When managed by competent staff, seed fairs 
provide an opportunity to identify ways to 
strengthen seed systems by supporting seed 
production, marketing and system integration.
2.  SV&F increases ﬁnancial and social capital in 
the target communities. 
 Unlike DSD, where seed companies, procurement 
agencies, large traders and transporters capture 
most of the beneﬁt, the proceeds from the sale of 
seed is shared mostly among community-based 
traders (many of whom are women). This results 
in increased ﬁnancial and social capital in the 
communities.
3.  SV&F strengthens the integration of the formal 
and farmer seed systems. 
 SV&F provides an opportunity for sellers of 
commercial and farmer seed to compete for 
customers. Where commercial seed companies 
or stockists have been represented at fairs, 
farmers have often opted to spend at least a 
portion of their vouchers on commercial seed, for 
example on hybrid maize or on a new variety of 
bean or pigeonpea.
4. SV&F gives farmers relative choice of crop and 
varieties. 
 A diversity of crops and varieties are on offer at 
seed fairs, usually reﬂecting the predominant 
crops sold also at local seed/grain markets. 
Farmers have the option to use their vouchers to 
obtain crops and varieties of particular interest 
and to access multiple types of seed.
Disadvantages
Main disadvantages of Direct Seed Distribution:
1. The approach tends to be top down and 
centralized. 
 DSD is generally not planned and implemented 
with communities. As a supply-side approach, the 
implementers tend to make the major decisions 
on seed procurement and distribution.
2. There are important risks of wrong varieties or 
crops. 
 Because seed is sourced either commercially 
or in bulk, a narrow range of crops and varieties 
tend to be on offer in DSD. Particularly where 
companies and seed parastatals are targeted 
towards medium and higher potential farming 
areas, the crops and varieties on offer for 
emergency may not be suitable for the conditions 
of vulnerable or marginal small farmers.
3. The large scale of seed acquisition results in a 
skewed distribution of beneﬁts. 
 Mega-tendering (that is purchasing large amounts 
of seed) means mega-proﬁt for the successful 
bidders and transporters. The value of the seed 
received by farmers is but a small fraction of the 
total project cost. 
4. Emergency DSD purchase undermines market 
functioning. 
 The free delivery of seed, directly and on a large 
scale, undermines the functioning of local seed/
grain markets and compromises the development 
of longer-term more commercial seed supply 
systems. Furthermore, while DSD can be quite 
proﬁtable for seed companies, such enterprises 
often opt for sales to emergency NGOs after a 
disaster and may neglect their network of rural 
stockists and customers.
Main disadvantages of Seed Vouchers & Fairs:
1. The approach is difﬁcult to implement quickly 
and to scale up. 
 SV&F is decentralized and management intensive. 
Many NGOs have never implemented SV&F and so 
they require training, which takes time. Each fair 
can serve on average only 500 farmers – which 
means that multiple teams have to operate 
concurrently and for several weeks to reach even 
10,000 farmers.
2. SV&F requires knowledge and capacity of seed 
systems. 
 Unlike DSD, SV&Fs are not once-off distributions. 
Rather they are the start of a process of relief, 
recovery and development that spans three years 
or more. This process requires competent and 
dedicated agriculture staff, which most relief 
agencies currently lack.
3. SV&F practitioners have less access to seed of 
commercial and researcher varieties. 
 Given a choice, seed companies will prefer 
DSD over SV&F. In DSD the relief agency is the 
customer and relief agencies are ideal customers 
because they place large orders, always pay on 
time and rarely complain. In contrast, reaching 
rural farmers is expensive and risky because 
smallholders may decide not to purchase the 
more expensive commercial seed.
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Concerns Common to Both: Seed Quality 
It is essential that the seed delivered by seed aid 
is of acceptable quality, so that it can hasten the 
process of recovery. Concerns about quality are 
often at the heart of critiques of both approaches, 
DSD and SV&F. 
 Stereotypes often judge seed from the formal 
or commercial sector as high quality, healthy and 
having high germination, while seed from the 
informal sector (home-produced and procured 
from the market) is deemed of poor seed quality.  
 However, grounded analyses show that such 
labels can be deceptive (see Brief No. 2). The 
health quality of formal-sector seed may not be as 
advertised, while at the same time select laboratory 
analyses have demonstrated good quality in farmer 
seed and market seed (western Kenya case). Overall, 
emergency-grade seed is variable in health and 
genetic quality (eastern Kenya case). The point is not 
to assume the quality of seed from a given source 
because of the source. Other methods may be 
needed to verify standards. 
 The focus on seed health as a measure of quality 
in emergency seed aid has diverted attention from 
what is probably the more important quality issue: 
suitability. The seed on offer must be adapted to the 
growing and stress conditions at hand, and should 
have generally acceptable crop characteristics. It is 
puzzling that genetic quality has in practice been 
given second priority in emergency responses. While 
relatively few crops and varieties are multiplied 
by the formal sector, those emerging from formal 
research sectors or on offer from commercial 
companies are assumed to be good enough for 
emergency distribution, regardless of whether they 
have been selected for use in the regions of stress, 
can be grown under the management conditions 
actually practiced by farmers, or are acceptable to 
those preparing food. On this last point, farmers may 
be given orange-ﬂeshed sweet potatoes or yellow 
maize when cultural preferences abhor such choices, 
preferring white sweet potatoes or white maize. In 
the relief business there are often trade-offs between 
accessing seed with locally-accepted agronomic and 
consumer qualities versus seed with highly deﬁned 
health and viability standards. 
Looking Forward: Direct versus  
Market-Based Aid
Concern has been growing among donors, 
agriculture researchers and NGO practitioners that 
Direct Seed Distribution has become repetitive 
and is expensive, with little impact beyond the few 
kilograms of seed received by farmers. In addition, 
evidence is accumulating that the seed security 
problem is often not one of seed availability or 
quality, but rather of lack of access to seed. Hence 
there is now increased interest in the use of a range 
of market-based approaches to emergency seed  
aid. 
 With growing donor support (particularly 
from the Ofﬁce of Foreign Disaster Assistance/
USAID), large NGOs such as CRS, CARE, World 
Vision International, and Save the Children UK 
are increasingly 
using Seed 
Vouchers & Fairs 
in their relief and 
recovery efforts. 
One of the more 
dramatic shifts 
to date has been 
in Mozambique, 
where the 
government has 
dropped DSD and 
shifted to vouchers 
with support from 
the International 
Center for Research 
in the Semi-Arid 
Tropics (ICRISAT) 
and FAO. 
   There are 
a number of 
important 
challenges 
related to SV&F 
implementation, 
including the 
requirement 
for increased 
agricultural 
technical 
competence, the 
need to engage 
the formal seed 
sector – especially 
agricultural 
research – to 
enable farmers to access seed of new and promising 
varieties, and the pull for SV&F to remain innovative 
and not become stagnant or repetitive. Relief 
agencies that want to implement SV&F need to 
hire, train and retain competent agricultural staff. 
This will not be easy as many agencies have no 
agriculture capacity and treat seed as they would 
any other relief commodity.    
Furthermore, in order to give farmers access to 
seed of new and promising varieties at seed fairs, 
research organizations will also need support to 
ensure that seed is multiplied and on offer at the 
fairs. Finally, effective monitoring and evaluation and 
Direct seed  
distribution is easy  
to scale up, supports 
the formal sector  
and can be used  
to disseminate new 
varieties widely. Seed 
vouchers and fairs 
strengthen local  
systems and  
strengthen social  
and ﬁnancial capital  
in communities.   
They offer farmers 
more choice (of both 
local and new crops 
and varieties) and  
can pave the way for  
integration between 
formal and  
informal systems.
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timely reporting are needed to continue to capture 
opportunities created by SV&F.
 The increasing use of vouchers and direct 
cash approaches more generally to address the 
problem of lack of access is both a promising sign 
and a strong signal. Homing in on the problem of 
access and letting farmers make their emergency 
choices should enhance the odds that immediate 
aid meets priority needs. However, the recognition 
that concerns about access are central should serve 
to help shift aid away from emergency responses 
altogether for seed and non-seed. The inability 
to access a good is one of the problems of basic 
poverty. Hence, the scope of assistance needs to go 
well beyond emergency aid, and towards approaches 
that strengthen basic livelihood strategies, for 
example agro-enterprise and income generation 
programs.
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The Power of Evaluation
The current state of evaluation in seed aid is dismal indeed. In principle at least, practitioners understand and embrace the importance of evaluation in learning from experience and improving performance. Unfortunately, however, seed interventions are often seen as 
straightforward, one-off, and output focused: react quickly, distribute seed and 
close out. Evaluations are not relevant.
 This attitude has resulted in a remarkable stagnation in how seed 
security is understood and assessed and how interventions are planned and 
implemented. Fortunately, ideas are changing. With a growing realization that 
seed systems are complex and resilient and that local institutions – especially 
markets – can and should play a central role in recovery, initial seed aid 
responses are now seen as the ﬁrst important step in an ongoing process 
that may last many years. Evaluation has become essential to ensure that 
experience leads to learning and that learning informs the next step in the 
process. This will lead to better projects, which in turn will result in stronger 
and more resilient seed systems that underpin sustainable seed security. 
Evaluations should help to correct common and immediate problems such as 
poor targeting, unsuitable crops or varieties on offer and dependency creation. 
 Rather than turning their attention to evaluation at the end of implementation, 
practitioners should reﬂect on the evaluation when designing the intervention. 
What should be the outcomes of the intervention and for whom? For how  
long, and at what intervals, will the agency need to monitor the range of 
effects of its assistance? Time and budget commitments should be made 
accordingly.
Types of evaluation
There are several different types of evaluations.
Real time evaluations 
One can use interviews, for example just after seed distribution or as people 
leave seed fairs, to obtain feedback from beneﬁciaries. This feedback is then 
used immediately to inform the next planned event. Real time evaluations 
monitor information to ensure that the process is on track and that problems 
are identiﬁed and corrected as quickly as possible.
Output evaluations 
Interviews are conducted right after the intervention (within one month) 
to provide feedback from practitioners, partners and beneﬁciaries on the 
logistics of the intervention (its timing, targeting, distribution mode, etc.). This 
is the classic type of post-mortem evaluation that satisﬁes donor requirements 
and closes a project.
Outcome evaluations 
At the end of the cropping season interviews evaluate the effectiveness or 
outcome of the intervention in terms of impact on crop production and next 
Seed Aid for Seed Security
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Practitioners should 
embrace evaluation 
as an exceptional 
learning opportunity. 
Donors need to 
support practitioners 
in contributing to the 
body of knowledge, 
rather than merely 
holding them 
accountable for 
mistakes made.
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season’s seed security. An outcome evaluation shifts 
the focus from what was done (outputs) to what 
might be done next to support continuing recovery.
Impact evaluations 
Longer term follow up, conducted after three to ﬁve 
seasons, aims to evaluate the broader impact of the 
interventions on seed system resilience and food 
security. This type of evaluation seeks to capture 
and share learning and best practices for the wider 
practitioner community.
Meta-analyses and evaluations 
This type of evaluation compares several 
interventions at once. The interventions may be 
of the same type (for instance, a range of direct 
seed distributions) or they may represent different 
approaches, such as direct seed distribution and 
seed vouchers 
and fairs. Meta-
analyses may even 
assess the totality 
of seed system 
interventions in a 
given geographical 
area. Such 
evaluations can 
also be used 
to compare 
performance 
across countries, 
with different 
seed systems, 
experiencing 
different disasters and different levels of seed 
insecurity. 
 Meta-analyses generally focus on the 
effectiveness of the approach itself. They are of 
special interest to practitioners committed to 
learning how to improve seed-aid planning and 
implementation by deepening their understanding of 
seed systems and the strengths and weaknesses of 
different kinds of response. 
Evaluation as the cornerstone of learning
Evaluations present a wonderful opportunity for 
learning – ﬁrst and foremost for the implementers 
but also for the wider practitioner and donor 
communities. The challenge for practitioners is to 
stop treating evaluations as an onerous requirement 
and to recognize them as the exceptional learning 
opportunities that they are. The discussion of 
whether evaluations should be internal or external 
misses the point – which is that they should focus 
on learning. That requires the practitioners to be 
actively involved in the evaluation with the intention 
of using the results to improve practices. Therefore, 
perhaps one of the better models involves an 
externally-facilitated evaluation.
 Although donors accept output-focused post 
mortems, they also support rigorous outcome 
evaluations. The challenge for seed aid donors 
is to become more proactive in supporting 
evaluation. This will require donors to embrace 
learning and sharing as the principle objectives 
of evaluation, rather than regarding evaluation 
as simply reporting and closing. Donors need to 
communicate their support for learning-focused 
evaluations. They should shift their focus from 
holding practitioners accountable for mistakes 
made to supporting practitioners in contributing 
to the body of knowledge on seed assistance. It is 
also vital that donors give attention to how those 
implementing – and everyone else involved in seed 
aid – subsequently apply the lessons learned during 
the evaluation. 
Guide Questions for Different Types 
of Evaluation 
In the table opposite we suggest some of the varied 
issues that might be embraced by the different types 
of evaluations introduced in the previous section. 
The list is suggestive, to give examples of key issues 
at different levels of evaluation, and is a long way 
from being exhaustive. What is important is to 
emphasize that:
■ The key evaluation issues change through time.
■ All four types of evaluations are important and 
are not interchangeable.
■ The recipients’ views and actual effects on 
the ground have to ﬁgure among the essential 
elements.
Note that current evaluation and monitoring, if 
done at all within seed aid projects, is generally 
limited to the inputs distributed and the efﬁciencies 
of the operation (its timeliness and numbers of 
beneﬁciaries reached). Evaluations have to address 
concerns of basic intervention effectiveness, such 
as whether the precise activities made a difference 
to the farmers in the farming system and more 
broadly to the local economy. While the insights of 
implementers are important for improving practice, 
the recipients’ point of view should be given equal 
weight; to do so requires considerable ﬁeld time to 
be allocated for evaluation.
 To reiterate, evaluations at all levels present 
important opportunities for learning and thus to 
improve practice. However, such evaluations require 
real reﬂection and commitment as well as time, 
energy and ﬁnancial resources. In completing the 
cycle, practitioners have to be prepared to use the 
results for speciﬁc projects and to incorporate their 
wider lessons into future program design.
Evaluations must 
address concerns of 
basic intervention 
effectiveness. Have 
activities made a 
difference to farmers, 
farming systems and 
the local economy?
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Seed System Relief and Evaluation Overview: Select themes to be addressed
Type of Evaluation Agency’s assessments of Recipients’ assessments of 
Real-time  
(during intervention)
Insights (from diverse perspectives) on:
■ Products on offer (crop and variety choice, seed quality, seed amounts)
■ The immediate intervention process, whatever recipients signal as important, e.g.
• Length of intervention, including waiting time
• Number and order of farmers served
• Adequacy of support personnel
Output  
(after about  
one-month)
Insights (from diverse perspectives) on the efﬁciency, organization and logistics of intervention.
■ Timing (especially in relation to subsequent planting)
■ Targeting (process and perceived ‘fairness’)
■ Choice of locales
■ Choice of crops and varieties
■ Adequacy of seed quality on offer (and validity of process guiding quality veriﬁcation)
■ Adequacy of preparatory information or sessions
■ Scale (numbers served, overall amounts of seed or products delivered or made accessible)
What worked? What was missing? What modiﬁcations should be made in future?
Outcome  
(after ﬁrst season)
Insights on ﬁrst effects of intervention. 
Recipient Focus:
■ Yield performance and farmer satisfaction with crops and varieties obtained as aid 
(qualitative and quantitative variety attributes)
■ Importance of seed aid in relation to farmers’ other seed sources
• What proportion of the aid given was sown and why?
• What proportion of the total seed sown came from aid (versus home-saved seed, local 
markets, exchange) and why?
Farming System and Implementer Focus:
■ Was the impact of the disaster on farming systems sufﬁciently understood to guide planning 
(looking with hindsight)?
■ Was the general choice of intervention valid (and linked to a speciﬁc seed security need?)
■ Was the intervention actually needed? Evidence?
■ Did the intervention strengthen or protect seed security? Evidence?
■ Which broad groups were reached by the intervention and which not?
■ Were there any unanticipated positive effects?
■ Were there any unanticipated negative effects?
What worked? What was missing? What modiﬁcations should be made in future?
Impact evaluations 
(after several seasons)
Impact – positive and negative – of intervention on:
■ Stability of production and food security
■ Biodiversity of crops and varieties
■ Household income and local economy
■ Seed channel functioning, including local seed/grain markets and development of 
commercial enterprises
■ System resilience to possible next set of shocks
TABLE 1
Themes to address in evaluation
CONTINUED ON PAGE 4
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Meta-analyses 
(after cluster of 
interventions 
completed)
Content here would vary according to what is being compared. Some general guide themes.
Strengths and weakness of a speciﬁc type of intervention (e.g. Direct Seed Distribution) for 
speciﬁc contexts (e.g. civil strife, ﬂood, drought).
■ For whom?
• farmers
– male
– female
• children
• traders
• commercial companies
■ immediate effects
• range of beneﬁts and costs
– agronomic
– environmental
– economic
– social
■ longer-term effects
• range of beneﬁts and costs
– agronomic
– environmental
– economic
– social
Comparative advantages among different interventions (e.g. cash and voucher delivery, direct 
seed distribution, seed vouchers and fairs, seed protection rations)
■ Which contexts?
■ For whom?
■ Immediate effects?
■ Longer-term effects?
Seed System Relief and Evaluation Overview: Select themes to be addressed
Type of Evaluation Agency’s assessments of Recipients’ assessments of 
 
Developing a  
Seed-Aid Proposal:
A Rapid Review Checklist  
for Practitioners
Disaster has a devastating impact on agricultural livelihoods and often demands support in the food security sector. Even as immediate needs are being considered, attention turns to supporting agricultural recovery, and that often includes seed 
assistance. The design of these seed-aid proposals is challenging for three 
reasons: seed interventions are complex and context-speciﬁc, especially so 
following a disaster; time is short as seed is needed before the next planting 
season; and the implementing agency best placed to respond often lacks 
experience and expertise in seed systems and seed security analysis.
 This rapid review checklist is intended to assist practitioner agencies 
to review and provide feedback to people who are developing proposals 
focused on seed security. It can help to determine whether proposals have 
exploited the seed-assistance body of knowledge, whether they are grounded 
in an understanding and appreciation of farmer systems and capacity, and 
whether they reﬂect better seed-aid practices. Proposal writers too can use it 
to determine whether they have covered the major topics before prescribing 
a response of seed aid. It can also be used by donors to complement other 
project review guidance.
 The checklist highlights issues that are unique and critical for guiding 
seed security strategy and the design of broad seed system interventions. 
It is emphatically not a ‘how to do seed aid’ manual. The Table overleaf 
presents the various elements of the checklist. Each of the assessment 
criteria is then discussed in more detail.
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Working through 
a set of 
guiding criteria, 
practitioners can 
ensure that any 
proposals for 
implementing seed 
system support 
are well-grounded 
and stand a 
good chance of 
achieving their 
objectives. 
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CRITERIA Y N Further Needs/Comments
Assessments
1
Is the disaster sufﬁciently well described, in terms 
of scope and detail, to provide context for the 
intervention?
2 Have the ex ante cropping systems been adequately and accurately described?
3 Have the ex ante seed systems been adequately and accurately described?
4 Is the diagnosis of the impact of the disaster on seed security supported?
5
From the assessment, does it appear appropriate 
and feasible to consider a farming-related 
intervention within the period speciﬁed?
Intervention Objectives and Strategy
6 Are the proposed objectives for seed-related assistance clear? 
7
Do the objectives and proposed strategy address 
the seed security problem?
• short term
• longer term
8 Is the proposed strategy sound and supported by past experience?
9 Have the populations needing seed-related assistance been adequately deﬁned?
10 
Are the choices for seed channels clearly 
explained and justiﬁed? (Distinguish between seed 
multiplication and distribution, if appropriate.)
Implementation and Activity programming
11
If seed is to be made available through some form 
of aid, are the activities for ensuring variety and 
seed quality explicit and sufﬁcient?
12
Are monitoring, evaluation and reporting planned 
and budgeted? (Distinguish short-term focus on 
outputs and longer-term focus on impact and 
learning.)
13 Is an exit strategy articulated?
14 Does the proposal engage and empower women and communities? 
15
Is there the required expertise and capacity to 
achieve the objectives (both within the institution 
and via collaborators)?
16 Is the timing feasible to achieve the objectives?
17 Have possible negative effects been anticipated (with necessary actions programmed)?
TABLE 1
Rapid Review Checklist
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Explanation of Review Criteria
1. Is the disaster sufﬁciently well described, in 
terms of scope and detail, to provide context for the 
intervention?
Before focusing on the seed or agricultural systems, 
one needs to have an overview of the effects of 
the disaster, to assess whether an agricultural 
intervention is warranted at all. Obviously, the scale 
and scope of the disaster need to be understood, 
including details of the people and regions affected. 
For seed-related interventions, the heterogeneity 
of impact is particularly important, because less-
affected regions may provide useful supplies of 
locally-adapted seed. Some guiding questions:
Is there reason to believe that the agricultural 
system was affected?
■ Did the stress affect natural capital?
• Land degradation (soil erosion)
• Access to land (in cases of conﬂict and 
displacement)
• Water shortage (drought)
■ Did the stress affect human capital associated 
with agriculture?
• Was there large loss of agricultural knowledge 
and labor due to death, displacement or 
migration?
■ Did the stress affect social capital associated with 
agriculture?
• Did war, civil strife, political tensions mean that 
labor sharing, seed exchange or cooperative 
arrangements may be altered?
■ Did the stress change ﬁnancial arrangements, for 
example access to agricultural credit or increases 
in debt?
■ Did the stress potentially affect physical capital?
• Loss of productive assets; draft animals, tools, 
granaries, crops and livestock
• Loss of domestic assets; homes, furnishing
• Loss of roads to market and damage to bridges
• Market function disrupted
2. Have the ex ante cropping systems been 
adequately and accurately described?
An understanding and appreciation of the existing 
cropping systems, before the stress or shock, needs 
to inform proposal development (whether or not one 
aims to maintain the pre-crisis status quo). The types 
of crops and varieties grown, their seasonality, and 
their end uses (for home consumption, income or 
both) are important kinds of information. Not all crops 
are equally important for farmers’ livelihoods, and the 
proﬁle of crops critical for poorer farmers may not be 
the same as for the better off. Input use and special 
management practices should also be noted.
3. Have the ex ante seed systems been adequately 
and accurately described?
Understanding the existing seed systems that 
farmers use in the target area informs the design 
of recovery activities. There is a better chance 
that recovery will be rapid and sustainable when 
an intervention is grounded in the dominant seed 
systems. Practitioners often source seed directly 
from the commercial seed sector in spite of the 
fact that poor farm families do not normally 
purchase commercial seed, because of the crops 
and varieties on offer and the cost. Farmers may 
normally get their seed from a range of channels: 
home production, local markets or from neighbors, 
and sometimes from more formal seed sellers as 
systems intensify. It is also important to understand 
that a disaster impacts each of these seed channels 
differently, some being more resilient than others. 
4. Is the diagnosis of the impact of the disaster on 
seed security valid?
Seed security needs to be diagnosed independently 
of food security, as the two are not always highly 
correlated. Households can have enough seed to sow 
a plot, but very little to 
eat at any one time.  
 Conversely, households 
can have adequate food, 
but lack access to the 
seed they need to make 
their plots productive. 
In assessing disaster 
impacts, quick deductions 
also need to be avoided, 
particularly the false 
notion that a drop in 
harvest, or production 
shortfall, automatically 
means that there is a seed 
shortfall. Similarly, when 
there is food insecurity, 
it is important not to 
hastily conclude that farm 
families have eaten all 
their seed. Seed insecurity 
can generally be 
understood as a problem 
of availability, a problem 
of access (related often to 
cost of seed) or a problem 
of seed quality or a lack 
of preferred crops and 
especially varieties. These 
problems also have to be framed as either short term 
(acute) or long term (chronic). 
A solid aid proposal 
builds from an  
understanding  
of seed systems  
and crop systems  
before as well  
as after the disaster. 
Recovery can  
be rapid and  
sustainable only when 
interventions work  
to support the  
dominant functioning 
systems.
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5. From the assessment, does it appear appropriate 
and feasible to consider a farming-related 
intervention within the period speciﬁed?
Are the people affected by the disaster otherwise 
seed secure? Are farmers conﬁdent that stability 
(security) is all they need to enable them to 
successfully cultivate and harvest? Do they have 
sufﬁcient access to ﬁelds and other means of 
production (such as labor) to follow through an 
agricultural season? Are they willing to re-engage in 
agriculture?
6. Are the proposed objectives for seed aid clear 
and do they address the seed security problem?
In reﬂecting on relief and recovery objectives, 
several points are important. Farming systems 
are not static; they 
change continuously 
in positive as well 
as negative ways. 
Furthermore, the 
demands of farmers 
for the things they 
need immediately, and 
which can spur them 
to recovery, should 
also be put in focus. 
The default objective 
is usually to facilitate 
the quick return of the 
cropping system to 
the status quo ante. 
If this is the chosen 
strategy, the strengths 
and weaknesses of 
the existing system 
should be understood, 
and built on 
accordingly. (Similarly, choices need to be made of 
the crops to focus on. Those most affected? Income 
generating crops? Crops for quick food recovery?) 
When a different objective is proposed, such as 
strengthening or improving the seed or crop system, 
perhaps by introducing new crops and varieties, this 
needs to be explained and justiﬁed in the context 
of an emergency response. In all cases, the risks 
involved need to be carefully analyzed. 
7. Do the objectives and proposed strategy address 
the seed security problem, in the short and the long 
term? 
A clear diagnosis of seed security status and a 
vision of whether the system should stay as it is or 
evolve should then lead to a set of activities that 
addresses the problems at hand. Are there clear 
links between the identiﬁed seed problem and the 
cluster of proposed relief activities? For instance, 
if the objective is to ensure that farmers have seed 
to plant in conditions of chronic drought, are the 
choice of crop and variety and the chosen seed 
system channel appropriate? Emergency proposals 
are by deﬁnition focused on response and short-
term recovery. However, it is important that they be 
designed within the context of what was in the past 
and what is desired in the future. 
8. Is the proposed strategy sound and supported by 
past experience?
This simple criterion is important because it 
indicates whether the practitioner is grounded in 
relevant past experience, either direct experience or 
indirect experience gathered from the growing body 
of knowledge on better seed-aid practices. More of 
the same may not be what is needed. In some cases 
capacity building (to test new options) may have to 
be built into proposal development.
9. Have the populations needing seed-related 
assistance been adequately deﬁned?
Seed is a relatively expensive commodity because 
only certain types are adapted and not all available 
seed will be of adequate quality. Targeting those 
who require seeds (as opposed to those who need 
food) can be important for ensuring that supplies are 
adequate. Deﬁning target groups is also important 
in determining which crops and varieties to give 
prominence. Women’s needs and preferences may 
differ from those of men; different ethnic groups 
may have different needs, as will those geared to 
growing for market compared to those growing for 
subsistence.
10. Are the choices of seed channels clearly 
explained and justiﬁed?
Individual farmers use seed channels differently, at 
different times and to differing degrees, to obtain 
seed of different crops and varieties. Some farmers 
use their own saved seed or seed obtained from 
neighbors for certain crops, others rely on the 
market for those same crops and still others prefer 
to purchase and plant commercial seed. Disaster 
inﬂuences farmer demand for seed from different 
channels for several reasons; lack of seed in a 
preferred channel, increase in price, lack of cash 
to purchase seed. The choice of a seed channel 
for aid must be grounded in an analysis of what 
farmers need in times of crisis, rather than being 
based on possibly vested interests on the supply 
side. Multiplication of seed, if programmed within 
the proposal, needs to be consciously designed 
from the beginning with an explicit linkage between 
production and distribution and marketing.
Seed system 
proposals need to 
be reviewed not only 
in terms of what 
they can strengthen, 
but also in terms 
of what they may 
damage.
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11. If seed is to be made available through some 
form of aid, are the activities for ensuring variety 
and seed quality explicit and sufﬁcient?
There are no absolute rules about what types of 
crops or varieties or what quality of seed should be 
given in an emergency. Ironically, donor demands 
rather than farmer needs sometimes dictate this 
critical item. Minimally, what is given or offered in 
a crisis should be at least as good and trustworthy 
as what farmers normally use. The proposal should 
show some evidence that what is on offer will do 
no harm and, more positively, that it may actually 
spur farmers onto a path of recovery. Involving 
farming communities and speciﬁc target groups in 
these critical choices increases the chances that 
seed given as aid will actually be sown and will 
subsequently grow and yield.
12. Are monitoring, evaluation and reporting 
planned and budgeted? 
In responding to an emergency, time may not 
be taken for rigorous monitoring, thoughtful 
evaluation and effective reporting. This has often 
been the case with seed aid, as year follows year 
of repetitive seed aid with no change in knowledge, 
attitudes or practice. Monitoring and evaluation 
have to go beyond an analysis of efﬁciency, 
focused on inputs, whether they were delivered 
on time and how many people were reached. They 
have to address basic issues of effectiveness: 
whether the activities made a difference to the 
farming system, perhaps in terms of crops and 
varieties, and more broadly to the local economy. 
Negative and positive reﬂections are equally 
important and integral to evaluation.
13. Is an exit strategy articulated?
There need to be benchmarks to seed system 
assistance beyond the delivery of seed. At some 
point, one should be able to exit from emergency 
activity and begin to program real development. 
Seed deliveries that last more than three or four 
seasons signal that aid action is off-course.
14. Does the proposal engage and empower women 
and communities?
Enabling communities to participate in their own 
development is always a challenge. Involving them 
in their own recovery from disaster is even more so. 
Nevertheless, it is important to engage communities 
in articulating the problem, identifying solutions, 
planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating. 
Women often play key roles in managing varieties 
and seed selection on farm, and in many regions 
(particularly in Africa) they are key sellers in local 
seed/grain markets. An intervention that empowers 
women results in quicker recovery and strengthens 
their traditional roles in seed systems.
15. Is there the required expertise and capacity to 
achieve the objectives (both within the institution 
and via collaborators)?
Seed aid is not a logistical exercise and is distinctly 
different from food aid. Such aid, better phrased as 
‘seed system support’, intervenes at the heart of 
an agricultural system, makes use of farmers’ land 
and labor at a risky and perhaps unstable period, 
and may have effects for seasons to come. Seed-
aid planning demands sound technical expertise 
and strategic farming-system thinking. Even during 
an emergency, it also requires a longer-term 
perspective. Agricultural expertise has to guide the 
center of seed assistance development (i.e. support 
should be cut to those who buy and distribute seed 
– and then move on to the next relief activity).
16. Is the timing feasible to achieve the objectives?
The pivotal issue is to ensure that farmers have 
seed in time, not only for planting but also in time 
to strategize about which crops and which varieties 
to plant in which ﬁelds. This means that seed has 
to be in farmers’ hands several weeks prior to 
sowing. Does the implementing agency have time 
to complete the range of logistical issues and still 
deliver seed far enough in advance of planting? 
Issues such as proposal review and responding 
to feedback, coordination among implementers, 
acquiring any needed inputs, ﬁeld staff coordination, 
and interaction with communities and local 
authorities all need to be considered to assess 
whether the timing is feasible.
17. Have possible negative effects been anticipated 
(with necessary actions programmed)?
Finally, seed interventions are a serious business. 
If done poorly and repetitively they can create 
dependencies, increase the risk of harvest failure, 
negatively change agrobioversity proﬁles and 
undermine functioning seed markets. Proposals 
need to be reviewed not only in terms of what they 
may strengthen but also in terms of what they may 
damage.
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CIAT International Center for 
Tropical Agriculture www.ciat.cgiar.org Louise Sperling l.sperling@cgiar.org
CRS Catholic Relief Services www.catholicrelief.org Tom Remington tremington@crsearo.org
USAID/OFDA United States 
Agency for International 
Development Ofﬁce of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance
www.usaid.gov/hum_response/ofda/
CARE Norway www.care.no Jon M Haugen  jon.haugen@care.no
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:
